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ABSTRACT
The electricity transmission and distribution (T&D) grid is undergoing a paradigm
shift as renewable generation explodes while flexible, storage-like loads are being
massively adopted. We address the intermittency and volatility issues of renewable
resources in connection with spatiotemporal distribution location-specific marginal-
cost-based prices (DLMPs) that guide flexible loads to utilize their significant degrees
of freedom for the purpose of providing valuable storage-like services to the grid in-
cluding demand response, energy charge/discharge arbitrage and regulation reserve
services. Dynamic DLMPs can induce socially optimal energy and reserve schedules
to be adopted by flexible load. To this end, existing transmission wholesale markets
must be extended to include distribution network connected participants. Since the
inclusion of the complex preferences of many flexible loads renders familiar central-
ized transmission market designs intractable, we propose and investigate tractable
decentralized market designs with Electric Vehicle (EV) battery charging selected as
the representative flexible load. We address the equilibrium existence, uniqueness,
vi
and efficiency issues that arise with decentralized market designs, using game theory
techniques. We investigate various multi-hour and multi-commodity (energy and re-
serves) market designs including EV self-scheduling under distribution network infor-
mation aware/unaware conditions, and single or multiple load aggregator(s) schedul-
ing groups of EVs. We investigate the role of network related information in enabling
partially price anticipating EVs to acquire market power and self-schedule to achieve
individual benefits at the expense of social welfare. Our contribution is the proof of
existence and uniqueness of decentralized market equilibria, as well as analytical and
numerical comparative analysis.
Secondly, we depart from the usual ideal battery assumption, employing instead
a realistic two bucket model. We then develop a novel Markovian Decision Process
(MDP) application to estimate the regulation tracking cost incurred over an hour by
an EV charger employing an optimal controller to respond to the regulation signal
which is reset every two seconds by the system operator. The hourly tracking error
increases when the EV promises higher regulation reserves while at the same time
demanding an achievable albeit high average charging rate. We solve the MDP re-
peatedly, in fact off line, to capture the impact of the average charging rate and the
regulation reserves promised at the beginning of an hour to the resulting hourly reg-
ulation tracking error. We then estimate a convex closed form relationship mapping
hourly charging rate and regulation reserve offerings to the expected hourly tracking
error cost. These convex tracking cost functions provide crucial input to the day
ahead hourly energy bids and regulation reserve offers made by individual EVs to the
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In recent years, electricity Transmission & Distribution (T&D) networks have been
undergoing a paradigm shift. Increased penetration of distributed renewable gen-
eration resources, advanced communication and information technologies, increased
capabilities of demand side resources connected to distribution networks, and pro-
liferation of energy storage are changing the interactions among the participants in
the T&D network. As much as this paradigm shift carries immense potential and
opportunities for an efficient and dynamic grid, challenges due to the intermittency
of renewable resources, changing load shapes due to variability, and higher peak load
from electrification adoption also follow. Renewable generation, albeit environmen-
tally sustainable, brings significant reliability challenges to the existing T&D structure
and operations (Ela et al., 2011). Demand side distribution network-connected flex-
ible resources are able to shift their hourly consumption, generation, and state of
charge levels, thereby providing valuable reliability services to the grid and help man-
age the volatility issues of renewable generation. Examples to these resources include
but are not limited to Electric Vehicles (EVs), smart thermostats, battery storage
systems, and smart inverters. Battery-like resources can in addition provide fast-
response requiring ancillary energy services, such as frequency regulation reserves,
which are deployed in real-time according to signals provided by grid operators at the
seconds time scale in order to keep stability of the grid. Electrification impact studies
show that not utilizing the flexibility of the aforementioned resources result in higher
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peak loads compared to scenarios where ability of flexible loads to shift consumption
across time is not utilized (Mai et al., 2018). In this thesis, we focus on EVs for
two reasons: (i) their ability to flexibly schedule their charging while providing fast
ancillary services to the grid, and (ii) the increased interest on the electrification of
the transportation sector. As of 2018, global EV stock including plug-in hybrids and
battery EVs has reached 5.1 million, exhibiting a 62% increase from the year before
(IEA, 2018). In US, total number of EVs has reached 1.18 million in March 2019
(EEI, 2019).
To this end, integration and management of flexible loads connected to the dis-
tribution networks is crucial in order to extract their true capabilities of keeping the
T&D grid reliable through mitigating the adverse impacts from volatile renewable
generation and providing energy arbitrage. However, a direct load control approach
for instance by a distribution utility company, is infeasible due to the number of
flexible devices and EVs connected, or is expected to be connected, to the distribu-
tion network. Thus, a market driven approach, drawing parallels from the wholesale
markets, has become the focus (Caramanis et al., 2016), (Ntakou, 2017) ,(Ilic et al.,
2011).
Transmission network wholesale markets have been successfully implemented in
United States since the late 1990s, where electricity is bought and sold in bulk between
centralized generators and resellers, at the economically efficient spatiotemporal mar-
ket clearing prices determined by Independent System Operators (ISOs). Wholesale
markets where centralized generators are scheduled could bring significant benefits if
extended to incorporate distribution network connected participants. However, the
traditional centralized market clearing approach used for the transmission wholesale
markets is bound to become computationally intractable given the large number of
distribution network connected participants. Besides, the dimensionality of the dis-
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tribution network compared to the transmission network renders the calculation of
prices centrally for each distribution network location impractical. In addition, a
centralized distribution network market clearing would require EVs to submit their
preferences and plug-in times to the system operator, which may not be preferable
by EV owners due to privacy concerns. Thus, it can be argued that decentralized
market clearing relying on iterative algorithms where EVs self-schedule responding
to prices is the only feasible option.
In the first part of this thesis, referred to as Part I from this point on, we propose
and formulate in detail, then analytically and numerically evaluate various decentral-
ized market clearing designs that allow participation of flexible resources in energy
and regulation reserve markets. We focus on a multi-commodity and multi-period
day ahead market where energy consumption/generation and regulation reserve offer
by EVs and generators are co-optimized, and the T&D markets are cleared simulta-
neously. Our contributions in Part I of this thesis can be listed as follows, which are
elaborated on later in Section 2.2:
• We formulate and analyze day ahead multi-commodity (energy and reserves)
and multi-period decentralized distribution market clearing designs,
• We address the equilibrium existence and uniqueness issues that arise with
decentralized market designs using game theory techniques and analyzing the
equilibria in the Nash Equilibrium context,
• We address equilibrium efficiency, by analytically and numerically comparing
decentralized market design equilibria to the centralized market clearing design
equilibria that maximizes the social welfare.
In the existing literature, the existence and uniqueness of market equilibria is gen-
erally investigated for single commodity and single period markets (Saad et al., 2011),
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(Wu et al., 2012a), (Motto et al., 2002), (Maharjan et al., 2016), and (Nekouei et al.,
2015). We extend this investigation to multi-commodity markets through a serious of
techniques that transform the multi-commodity problems to single commodity ones.
In the second part of the thesis, Part II, we propose and apply a novel synthe-
sis of successive LP-based Markovian Decision Process (MDP) solutions to estimate
the hourly average regulation signal tracking cost incurred by EVs offering reserves
while conforming to a realistic battery model. It is essential for EVs to determine
their optimal hourly energy consumption and reserve offer levels in accordance with
reserve deployment costs as part of their day ahead scheduling decisions, since the eli-
gibility to participate in the regulation reserve market is conditional upon acceptable
performance (PJM, 2018). Although EV dynamics that drive optimal energy and
reserve scheduling decisions enforce a constant, sustainable hourly charging rate, the
real-time charging rate of an EV varies every few seconds due to real-time deployment
of regulation reserves. Thus, EVs might not be able to sustain the real-time varying
charging levels due to battery charging and capacity constraints, and in return incur
penalty costs for not fully deploying requested reserves. The proposed MDP method-
ology allows us to obtain the hourly regulation reserve deployment cost as a function
of hourly energy consumption and reserve offer decisions, and the initial battery state
at the beginning of the hour. In Part II of the thesis, our contributions can be stated
as follows:
• Through a novel, partially parallelizable, scalable, and successive LP-based
MDP solution methodology, we obtain optimal regulation reserve deployment
of EVs in the seconds time scale capturing the dependency of the optimal de-
ployment decision on the time remaining in the hour and the current state of
charge,
• At the last step of the successive LP-based MDP methodology, we obtain aver-
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age hourly cost associated with the fixed hourly energy consumption and reserve
offer, as well as the initial state of charge of the battery at the beginning of the
hour,
• We approximate the average tracking cost as a function of the fixed hourly
energy consumption and reserve offer, and initial state of charge.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents Part I
of the thesis which includes the detailed analysis of centralized and decentralized
market designs. Part II, the optimal deployment of regulation reserves and the MDP
methodology, is included in Chapter 3.
Section 2.1 provides background for Part I and Section 2.2 lists Part I contri-
butions in more detail. Section 2.3 includes a review of the existing literature. In
Section 2.4, we introduce our stylized T&D network and identify the market partic-
ipants. Section 2.5 includes the formulations and detailed discussion of centralized
and decentralized market designs. In Section 2.6, we compare the problems through
first order optimality conditions, which allows us later in Section 2.7 to characterize
important properties of the EV optimal solutions in the decentralized designs. By us-
ing these properties, we also show in Section 2.7 the existence and uniqueness of the
Nash Equilibrium of EV schedules in the decentralized designs for given wholesale
transmission prices. Section 2.8 derives closed-form expressions assuming identical
EV preferences and relaxing the charging rate constraints. In Section 2.9 we illus-
trate numerically the differences in the equilibria among the market designs, and
investigate the market power exhibited by information aware EVs and compare total
participant costs. Part I summary is included in Section 2.10.
Chapter 3 presents Part II of the thesis. Following an introduction in Section
3.1 that also lists our contributions in that part of the thesis, Section 3.2 presents a
realistic two-bucket battery charging model. In Section 3.3, we show how the tracking
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cost can be incorporated in the EV day ahead scheduling problem and drive optimal
energy consumption and reserve offer decisions. In Section 3.4, we introduce the
regulation signal tracking problem and our novel successive LP-based MDP solution
methodology formally. Section 3.5 includes the numerical results where we evaluate
the MDP methodology for various fixed levels of energy consumption and reserve
offer decisions. In Section 3.6, we analyze the optimality conditions of the EV self-
scheduling problem with the inclusion of the tracking cost in the objective function.
Part II summary is included in Section 3.7.




Part I: Analysis of Centralized and
Decentralized Market Clearing Designs
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Paradigm Shift in Distribution Networks
Distribution networks have been changing rapidly, with the rise of smart appliances
and resources, distributed renewable generation, storage-like loads, and other gener-
ating resources. This paradigm shift poses many opportunities in the T&D grid, as
well as challenges.
For instance, the uncertainty and intermittency of electricity supply from renew-
able resources causes abrupt changes in net load, challenges in ensuring instantaneous
load and generation balance, system stability and frequency, and increase in magni-
tude of regulation reserves required. Distribution network related challenges include
power quality issues such as voltage violations and fluctuations, phase imbalance, and
reverse power flow (Karimi et al., 2016). Therefore, there is a rapidly growing need
for fast-responding, flexible resources that can provide valuable services to the grid
and benefit from the synergies with renewable resources. However, these resources
carry potential that can only be extracted by utilizing their flexibility, which is de-
fined as the ability to shift consumption across the hours. For instance, a distributed
energy storage resource can help stabilize the grid by varying its real-time charging
and discharging levels over time, or help reduce renewable generation curtailment
8
levels when there is oversupply.
Thus, there is a need for smart control mechanisms that can maximize the benefits
from newly emerging smart distribution network-connected devices and participants.
However, due to the abundance of such devices, direct device control approaches are
not feasible. A market driven integration of distribution side connected participants
becomes the feasible approach, where participants self-schedule their consumption
and generation levels responding to dynamic, spatiotemporal price signals with the
purpose of maximizing their benefits.
2.1.2 Dynamic Distribution Markets
Transmission wholesale markets have been operating in US since late nineties, and In-
dependent System Operators (ISOs) PJM and NYISO implemented locational marginal
pricing in 1998 and 1999, respectively (Litvinov et al., 2019). Today, dynamic spa-
tiotemporal pricing exists in the wholesale transmission markets. These hourly lo-
cational marginal prices are referred to as Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) and
are calculated by using a centralized market clearing approach that also determines
generator schedules. As an example, Figure 2·1 shows the zonal LMP values for a
given hour in the territory of Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), showing
how the LMP values might differ across locations.
Drawing parallels from the wholesale market and LMPs, spatiotemporal prices for
the distribution network, so called Distribution Locational Marginal Prices (DLMPs),
can drive optimal schedules of distribution network market participants. However,
conventional centralized approach to clear the market is bound to become compu-
tationally intractable given the large number participants connected to distribution
networks, and their complex intertemporal dynamics. For instance, an EV battery
possesses nonlinear charging dynamics that needs to be considered when determining
its charging schedule. In addition to tractability, centralized market clearing approach
9
Figure 2·1: Locational Marginal Prices in the wholesale market (ER-
COT, 2019)
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raises privacy issues, since individual EVs would have to share their preferences such
as travel and plug-in times with a central operator who clears the market. Decentral-
ized market clearing designs with self-scheduling participants who adopt to granular
distribution network locational prices appears to be the only feasible approach (Cara-
manis et al., 2016), (Ntakou and Caramanis, 2014). Self-scheduling enables EVs to
optimally decide their hourly energy consumption and reserve offer levels in response
to marginal distribution locational prices. Distribution Locational Marginal Prices
(DLMPs), as will be formally defined in the following sections, are hourly distribution
network locational prices that are derived from transmission level locational prices, or
wholesale prices (LMPs) by adjusting for marginal line losses. In reality, DLMPs are
a function of other marginal costs, for instance transformer loss of life (Ntakou, 2017)
and binding voltage constraints, that we do not cover in this thesis. Qualitatively,
these marginal cost components have similar impacts to those of marginal network
losses.
2.1.3 Issues with Decentralized Market Designs
Decentralized market clearing through flexible load self-scheduling raises several ques-
tions: Are there conditions, e.g., distribution network information available to indi-
vidual participants or load aggregators, that allow self-scheduling with anticipation of
its impact on prices? Is there an equilibrium of the decentralized market designs? And
if so, can the iterative distributed algorithms associated with decentralized designs
converge to market clearing equilibria? Is the market clearing equilibrium unique? Fi-
nally, might social welfare be compromised, that is, are the market clearing equilibria
inefficient?
In this thesis, our goal is to use analytical and numerical means relying on central-
ized and decentralized market clearing designs in order to investigate the equilibrium
existence, uniqueness, and efficiency issues. Detailed convergence analysis can be
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found in (Gharesifard et al., 2013), (Ma et al., 2013), and (Ma et al., 2016). Our
investigation compares self-scheduling decentralized market designs to a centralized
market design where a single system operator, namely the Transmission & Distri-
bution System Operator (TDSO), clears the market to optimize social welfare with
complete knowledge of the T&D network characteristics and EV preferences and ca-
pabilities.
2.2 Part I Proposition and Contributions
In this part of the thesis, we focus on forward day-ahead energy and reserve mar-
kets, where hourly prices are calculated for the next operating day conditional upon
generator cost and quantity bids, and EV consumption schedule bids (PJM, 2018),
(Litvinov et al., 2019). Regulation reserves are used to fine tune generation and flex-
ible demand to keep the system frequency levels within an acceptable range. Market
participants that offer regulation reserves must track the regulation signal broadcast
by the system operator every two seconds, which indicates how much the participant
should vary its output or consumption in real time. Our market designs are therefore
multi-commodity, focusing on optimizing EVs’ dynamic regulation reserve offer in
addition to their energy consumption.
The decentralized market clearing designs we propose differ in EVs’ access to dis-
tribution network feeder information, and whether EVs individually participate in the
market or through a Load Aggregator (LA). If EVs have access to distribution net-
work feeder information, they are able to infer how the hourly local marginal prices
in their feeder, in other words DLMPs, are affected by their own and neighboring
EV’s actions, for given LMPs. Thus, we are able to formulate the individual EV and
LA self-scheduling decisions as a non-cooperative game, and apply game theoretical
methods to show the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium of the games
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associated with each decentralized market design. We also study the centralized mar-
ket clearing design where a single system operator, namely the TDSO has complete
knowledge on the T&D network characteristics and their participants, and clears the
market in a single step with the objective of maximizing social welfare. In the fol-
lowing sections, we use the centralized market design equilibrium as a benchmark,
comparing with the decentralized designs both analytically, and for small instances,
also numerically. Since the presence of a single TDSO operator who has complete
knowledge on T&D network is not practical, we propose a variation of the centralized
market design in which multiple collaborating system operators, namely a Transmis-
sion System Operator (TSO), and Distribution System Operators (DSOs) clear the
market together by exchanging information on optimal EV schedules and distribution
network marginal line losses. In this market clearing design, there is no single opera-
tor that has knowledge both on transmission and distribution network characteristics,
hence, it can be viewed as a more practical, and in terms of the equilibrium, a second
best social welfare, market design.
In the decentralized market designs, access to distribution network feeder informa-
tion gives EVs the opportunity to explicitly calculate DLMPs at their own location
from LMPs. DLMPs are comprised of two components; DLMP at a distribution node
is the sum of the substation LMP and the LMP multiplied by marginal losses on the
line connecting the distribution node to the substation. Feeder information refers to
the knowledge of the functional form of marginal line losses, therefore, if given this
information, EVs can estimate the DLMPs at the node where they are connected as
an explicit function of their individual and other EV consumption, given the LMP
at the substation. Note that LMPs are calculated by the system operators (collab-
orating TSO and DSO), and EVs do not know, nor they can learn how to impact
them in any of the market clearing problems. LMPs are the result of social welfare
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Figure 2·2: Market designs
optimization problems solved by the system operators.
Decentralized market clearing designs we propose in this thesis can be summarized
as follows; (i) EVs individually self-schedule and they are unaware of feeder informa-
tion. They synthesize DLMPs from the LMPs and the value of marginal line losses
they receive. Hence, they are price takers and cannot infer how they can impact the
marginal line losses nor the DLMPs, (ii) EVs individually self-schedule and they are
aware of feeder information. They receive LMPs and the value of marginal line losses,
they also have access to the functional form of marginal line losses. Hence, they can
anticipate how the DLMPs in their location are impacted by their own and neigh-
boring EVs’ actions, (iii) a single Load Aggregator (LA) at each distribution feeder
participates in the market and schedules all local EVs, and has feeder information,
(iv) multiple LAs in a single feeder schedules different groups of EVs, having access
to network information. The market designs employed for comparative analysis in
this thesis is shown in Figure 2·2.
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In the decentralized market design with a single LA, EVs are aggregated under
a single entity who simultaneously schedules all EVs in the same feeder. When EVs
are feeder information unaware, they simply respond to DLMPs, and don’t know
and can’t learn how their own or other EVs’ actions impact the LMPs or DLMPs.
After formulating in detail the aforementioned market clearing designs, we analyze
the properties of the EVs’ optimal schedules, when they are aware or unaware of the
feeder information.
Our contributions in Part I of this thesis can be listed as follows:
• We propose and model the salient details of decentralized multi-period multi-
commodity (24-hour energy and regulation reserve) market designs and consider
distribution network information aware and unaware EVs who participate in the
market individually, as well as Load Aggregators (LAs) who schedule groups of
EVs. We employ a high fidelity T&D network model, including characteristics
such as losses.
• In decentralized market designs, we show Nash Equilibrium existence and unique-
ness of EV and LA schedules, through two alternative proofs. We show that
the equilibrium of local price non-anticipating EVs or LAs is identical to that of
a centralized design, where the TSO (who schedules the EVs) receives DLMP
information from collaborating DSOs.
• We show existence and uniqueness of a decentralized market equilibrium, where
all EVs in a feeder are scheduled by a single network information aware LA to
whom they entrust their individual preferences.
• Both numerically and analytically, we investigate differences between central-
ized and decentralized market design equilibria, and evaluate impacts on social
welfare and EV charging costs.
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2.3 Literature Review
Decentralized control of demand side resources has gained significant attention in
the literature ((Rivera et al., 2013),(Liu et al., 2017),(Gan et al., 2013), (Andrianesis
and Caramanis, 2019)) since direct utility control methods ((Richardson et al., 2012),
(Wu et al., 2012b)) are not scalable for demand side participant market integration.
For instance, in (Richardson et al., 2012), the system operator directly controls the
charging of each EV in the network in a centralized manner. In the EV charging
control literature, the system wide objective is generally to minimize the energy cost
(Ma et al., 2016) or flattening the demand profile (Liu et al., 2017), (Gan et al.,
2013), (Le Floch et al., 2015) that exhibit deep and sudden drops, so called valleys,
due to high renewable penetration. In addition, most decentralized control methods
for EV charging are based on the assumption that EVs are price takers (Rotering and
Ilic, 2011), (Ma et al., 2016). In (Rotering and Ilic, 2011), a dynamic programming
approach is adopted to determine the optimal charging profiles of EVs for given
electricity price forecasts. In most works, distribution network characteristics such as
line losses are omitted (Le Floch et al., 2015), (Chen et al., 2010).
In (Liu et al., 2017), authors adopt a decentralized control scheme for EV charg-
ing with the objective of flattening the demand profile, however, distribution network
market with hourly locational marginal prices is not considered. Another decentral-
ized EV charging control for load flattening is studied by (Gan et al., 2013), where
the optimal EV charging schedules obtained from the decentralized and the central-
ized problems are identical, since distribution network properties such as losses are
not considered. In (Ma et al., 2016), distribution network costs such as transformer
overloading and increased line losses due to EV charging has been introduced to the
problem as an arbitrary cost function with respect to individual EV consumption,
but the quadratic and marginal losses are not modeled explicitly. In the same work,
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electricity generation cost is approximated as a quadratic function of total demand,
however, individual generators and their cost bids are not considered. In that case,
authors show that the outcome of the decentralized EV charging problem is unique
and identical to the centralized solution.
Due to the hierarchical nature of decentralized market structures where consumers
respond to prices set by the system operators or utility companies, and prices are de-
termined based on consumer responses, game theoretical models have been widely
adapted in energy market clearing design. An extensive review of game theoretical
applications in power systems is provided by (Saad et al., 2012). Game theory ap-
proaches can be applied to interactions among other types of flexible distribution
network connected participants, so called Distributed Energy Resources (DERs), as
well as hierarchical games between the DERs and electric utility companies. In the
hierarchical games, utility companies act as leaders setting the energy prices, and
DERs are followers who optimally respond to these prices. Game theoretical meth-
ods applied to DER-electric utility company interactions can be found in (Soliman
and Leon-Garcia, 2014), (Tushar et al., 2012), (Saad et al., 2011), and (Maharjan
et al., 2016). In (Tushar et al., 2012), authors study the hierarchical game between
the price-determining utility company and the EVs in a Stackelberg game context. A
Stackelberg game is a general hierarchical game where followers respond to leader’s ac-
tions and the leader determines prices knowing how the followers will respond (Basar
and Olsder, 1999). They also study the non-cooperative game among EVs since each
EV’s feasible space depends on others. However, EVs are price takers and do not
posses inter-temporal constraints. A single period, multi-level hierarchical game be-
tween the generators, electric utility companies and DERs is studied in (Maharjan
et al., 2016), where DERs cannot anticipate how they impact prices and decide their
optimal consumption level by maximizing their net utilities.
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The differences in individual versus load aggregator EV scheduling in the presence
of a large number of EVs are studied in (Vayá et al., 2015). However, distribution
network characteristics are not modeled, and their impact on the marginal cost that
drives prices is omitted. The eventual long-term adaptation of the distribution net-
work to increasing number of EVs is also not considered. The energy price is also
simplified as a linear function of the total load. In this thesis, we present a closed-form
of EV schedules enabled by a special case assuming an unlimited EV charging rate
capacity similar to the assumption used in (Vayá et al., 2015). In addition, we con-
struct the closed-form optimal market-clearing schedules under network conditions
necessary for adaptation of a large number of EVs and study important qualitative
differences between individual and load aggregator scheduling. Our previous work
also includes investigation of numerical differences in equilibria when multiple load
aggregators schedule different groups of EVs (Yanikara et al., 2018).
In (Ma et al., 2013), (Grammatico et al., 2015), (De Paola et al., 2018), equi-
librium existence and uniqueness is investigated for asymptotically increasing EVs
under the mean field game theory concept, where EVs respond to an aggregate pop-
ulation signal and the contribution of each individual EV to the aggregate signal is
negligible. In such a case, it is shown in (Ma et al., 2013) that the EV best-response
iterations converge to a unique Nash equilibrium. However, given the granularity
of the distribution network, it is interesting to consider interactions among a finite
number rather than an asymptotically increasing number of EVs. To this end, we
study the uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium for finite number of EVs connected to
the distribution network. Furthermore, for a simplified model with infinite charging
rate capacity and identical EVs, we derive closed-form Nash equilibrium schedules
for distribution network information-Aware/Unaware EVs.
We employ a potential function approach to show the Nash equilibrium unique-
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ness, where the potential function in which the aggregate function is devised to cou-
ple all EVs. This approach to show uniqueness has previously been adopted by
(Chen et al., 2010), (Xu et al., 2016), (Nekouei et al., 2015), and in our previous
work (Yanikara et al., 2019). Potential function approach to prove Nash equilibrium
uniqueness for a single commodity (energy) has also been adopted by (Deori et al.,
2018). However, similar to (Chen et al., 2010), topology of the distribution network
has not been considered and asymptotic behavior as number of EVs goes to infinity
has been analyzed without proper network adjustments. In this thesis, on the other
hand, we focus on a multi-commodity market design, and in addition provide analyt-
ical insights through closed form equilibrium solutions for simplified EV models.
Most game theoretical methods in flexible load control are applied to single period,
single product markets: (Saad et al., 2011), (Wu et al., 2012a), (Motto et al., 2002),
(Maharjan et al., 2016), and (Nekouei et al., 2015). In (Soliman and Leon-Garcia,
2014) and (Mohsenian-Rad et al., 2010), authors show the uniqueness of the equilib-
rium of the game among DERs in a multi-period model, however, DERs minimize the
same global objective. Price anticipating EVs are considered by (Latifi et al., 2018) in
a multi-period market setting, however, EVs only optimize their energy consumption
schedule and not regulation reserves.
In the following subsection, we introduce the simplified T&D network model and
identify the market participants.
2.4 T&D Network Model and Market Participants
The proposed T&D network model features centralized generators connected to the
high voltage/low losses transmission network, and consumers with both inelastic and
flexible demand connected to the low voltage high/losses distribution network. In-
elastic demand is modeled as a hard constraint and need to be satisfied each hour.
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For simplicity, we assume a rarely congested transmission network and approximate
it by a single virtual bus where all generation and distribution substations are con-
nected to and share the same energy and reserve LMPs during hour h, as shown in
Figure 2·3. That is, for each hour h, both energy and reserve transmission LMP, λPh
and λRh , is single valued. Further, this simplification does not affect the generality
of our analytical results; multiple transmission buses with limited capacity lines can
easily be handled in terms of modeling and analysis requirements. Notably, radial
operation of the distribution network is common in practice, therefore, we assume the
distribution nodes at a feeder are aggregated at a single node at the end of a single
line that connects the feeder to the transmission bus (see Figure 2·3). The single-line
approximation greatly simplifies the calculation of marginal distribution line losses,
which is formally defined later in this section.
EV j ∈ J consumes qPj,h amount of energy and provides qRj,h amount of regulation
reserves during hour h. We define Tj as the number of hours EV j is plugged in, and
assume that Tj is deterministic. The subset Jn,h is the set of EVs that are connected







where dfn,h is the inelastic load at feeder n. Quadratic distribution line losses can
then be modeled as a function of total load at feeder n, thanks to the single-line
approximation of the distribution feeders. Quadratic and marginal losses on the






1Index n is interchangeably used for both the distribution feeder location and the line connecting








where γn = 2
rn
V 2n
, with rn and Vn being the resistance of line n and the voltage level
at feeder n, respectively, We refer to γn as the line n loss factor. Note that, unless
there is generation at the distribution network level, marginal losses satisfy mn,h ≥ 0.
Distribution network locational marginal cost based prices (DLMPs) are related to
the transmission LMPs through marginal losses. We formally define this relationship
in subsection 2.5. A unit of reserve deployed by an EV j at the distribution feeder
level translates into a higher relief at the transmission level due to line losses. More
specifically, an increase of qRj amount in EV j’s total consumption requires a higher
increase in transmission-connected generation to make up for line losses, and vice
versa for a decrease in EV j’s consumption. Since the total EV energy consumption
demand compared to inelastic demand is fairly small and EV reserve deployment is
constrained by EV energy consumption, it is reasonable and practical to approximate
incremental losses by marginal losses.
Thus, qRj,h amount of reserves offered by an EV j at the distribution feeder n is
equivalent to qRj,h(1 +mn,h) of reserves at the transmission bus (Figure 2·3).
Each generator i ∈ I has a capacity and technical minimum of Qi, Qi. Generators
are only connected to the transmission network, and they can provide regulation
reserves in addition to energy generation at fixed marginal costs cPi and c
R
i . The total
energy generation cost, CPi (Q
P




i,h) of generator i















The affine cost functions above reflect the staircase structure of generators’ supply
function used in today’s wholesale markets. The implication of this is that LMPs
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Figure 2·3: T&D network, single transmission bus, multiple distribu-
tion feeders n = 1, ..., N .
become rather insensitive to the EV schedules. This is a reasonable choice given that
LMPs are dominated by the price inelastic conventional demand that will continue
to make up the bulk of consumption. This, however, is not true for DLMPs in
distribution network locations that EVs are connected to. In such locations, DLMPs
remain quite sensitive to EV schedules.
The T&D market is simultaneously cleared with the objective of achieving the
minimum energy generation plus reserve provision cost, as well as EV related costs.
Transmission wholesale LMPs and distribution DLMPs are obtained as a result of the
market clearing. We assume that the wholesale prices, LMPs, are fairly insensitive to
the total EV demand since these prices depend largely on conventional demand. In
the following section, we introduce our centralized and decentralized market designs












QP , QR {QPi ,∀i}, {QRi ,∀i}
dP , L,m {dPn,h,∀n, h}, {Ln,h,∀n, h}, {mn,h,∀n, h}
2.5 Centralized and Decentralized T&D Market Designs
In this section, centralized (Subsection 2.5.1) and decentralized (Subsection 2.5.2)
market design formulations as well as the underlying distributed algorithms are pro-
vided in detail.
2.5.1 Centralized Market Designs
Centralized market-clearing with a single TDSO (TDA)
In this centralized design, a single TDSO clears the market in a single step with
access to full distribution network information including distribution feeder specific




i , as well
as EV preferences and capabilities. The market equilibrium consists of a complete
centralized generation and EV energy and reserve schedule across feeders and hours















































i,h ≤ Qi ∀i, h→ Υi,h, (2.9)
QPi,h −QRi,h ≥ Qi ∀i, h→ Υi,h, (2.10)
• EV constraints: ∑
h
qPj,h ≥ sj ∀j → ζj, (2.11)∑
h
qPj,h ≤ Sj ∀j → ζ̄j, (2.12)
qRj,h + q
P
j,h ≤ qj ∀j, h→ ν1j,h , (2.13)
qRj,h − qPj,h ≤ 0 ∀j, h→ ν2j,h . (2.14)






j,h. Note that all decision variables are non-negative.
We refer to the above problem as TDA, where TD denotes simultaneous clearing of
the T&D networks, and A denotes the distribution feeder information-aware TDSO,
i.e., its knowledge of the detailed functional form of mn,h, and loss factor values, γn,
∀n.
The objective function (2.6) consists of total generation and reserve provision
cost, as well as aggregate EV costs. The term δ(qPj,h)
2 represents the EV battery
degradation cost, which penalizes fast charging due to battery health concerns (Moura
et al., 2013). The dual variables, λPh and λ
R
h , of the energy balance and reserve
requirements constraints in (2.7) and (2.8) represent the energy and reserve LMPs
at the transmission bus (or distribution substation) over the 24-hour daily cycle.
The energy balance (2.7) is a non-convex equality constraint due to the inclusion of











2 + dPn,h] ∀h→ λPh . (2.15)
We later argue using the first order optimality conditions in Section 2.6 that the above
inequality constraint will be binding in most cases.
The system reserve requirement inequality constraint in (2.8), which notably in-
cludes bilinear terms qPj,hq
R
j,h, states that total reserve provision by generators and
EVs must be equal to or greater than the system reserve requirement, Rh. Due to
the presence of nonlinear constraints, the centralized market design is not guaranteed
to have a unique optimal solution, nor it is straightforward to argue that the first
order necessary optimal conditions hold. However, for a single hour, single EV, and
single generator simplified problem, we show that the Mangasarian-Fromovitz con-
straint qualification holds for the centralized design. Constraint qualification, on the
contrary, is straightforward to be shown to hold in the EV scheduling problems in
the decentralized designs that is introduced in the following subsections. This is due
to the linearity of the EV related constraints (2.11)-(2.14).
For the simplified centralized market design, we argue that it is unlikely for all
the constraints except for non-negativity to be active at the optimal solution. We
therefore focus on the plausible combinations of active constraints at the optimal solu-
tion, assuming the generator capacity can satisfy higher demand levels and generator
capacity constraint is not binding.
Proposition 2.5.1 (Constraint qualification for the simplified centralized
market design). Let A(.) be the set of active constraints at the optimal solution in
the centralized market design, and ci be constraint i.
Let A = {ci|i = (2.15), (2.8), (2.11), (2.14)}. Then, the following is satisfied for
w ∈ R4:
∇ci(QP , QR, qP , qR)′w > 0, ∀i ∈ A (2.16)
Therefore, the Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification holds for the central-
ized, single period, single generator and single EV market design.
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Proof. Let w = {w1, w2, w3, w4}. Then, condition (2.16) can be explicitly written as:
−w1 + (1 + γ(qP + d))w3 > 0 (2.17)
−w2 − γqRw3 − (1 + γ(qP + d))w4 > 0 (2.18)
−w3 > 0 (2.19)
−w3 + w4 > 0 (2.20)
For w1 = (1 + γ(q
P + d))w3 − ε, w2 any negative number, w3 = −2ε, w4 = −ε, where
ε is a small positive number, the above system of inequalities is satisfied.
Given the transmission bus wholesale LMPs, λPh and λ
R
h , the marginal cost based
prices at distribution feeder n (DLMPs), λPn,h and λ
R
n,h, are given by:
2










Since there is no generation at the distribution network, mn,h(Σq
P
j,h) ≥ 0, hence,
λPn,h ≥ λPh and λRn,h ≥ λRh , ∀h. We refer to mn,hλPh and mn,hλRh as the distribution
component of DLMPs. We note again that the centralized market design with a single
TDSO requires complete knowledge of individual EV preferences and distribution
network feeder information, an onerous task in itself. Moreover, the non-convexities
identified in the above market clearing problem render its solution not scalable for
real size distribution networks. We still provide numerical solutions for the single
TDSO centralized market design equilibrium on a relatively small network, and use
its market outcome as a benchmark to the outcome of decentralized market designs.
Before proceeding with the decentralized designs, in the next subsection we explore a
variation of the single TDSO centralized market design, where the market is cleared
2In the decentralized market designs with DLMP based self-scheduling, distribution feeder
information-aware EVs or LAs have access to the exact functional form of DLMPs and price antici-
pation will be possible impacting the associated market outcome.
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by collaborating DSOs, and a single TSO. We show that this market design possesses
a parallelizable clearing process, and can hence be scaled to real size networks.
Centralized market design with TSO-DSO collaboration (TDUn)
In this market design, centralized generators and EVs are cleared by the TSO, who
does not have access to distribution feeder information, relying instead on DSOs that
calculate and pass on the value of total and marginal losses on each distribution
network feeder to the TSO. All EVs still communicate to the TSO their preferences
and capabilities, more specifically the battery degradation cost and their individual
constraints (2.11)-(2.14). The TSO proceeds to an iterative process interacting with
DSOs to obtain the value of total and marginal losses (Ln,h and mn,h) associated
with the most recent EV schedule set by the TSO. In this market design, the TSO
does not need to know the distribution line loss factors, γn. This market design is
referred to as TDUn, since the TSO is unaware of feeder information, however T&D
markets are still cleared simultaneously. The energy balance and reserve requirements
constraints (2.7) and (2.8) in the TDSO centralized problem are replaced with a Taylor
approximation. That is, the TSO in the TDUn market design solves the following






















































i,h ≤ Qi ∀i, h→ Υi,h (2.26)
QPi,h −QRi,h ≥ Qi ∀i, h→ Υi,h (2.27)
• EV constraints: ∑
h
qPj,h ≥ sj ∀j → ζj, (2.28)∑
h
qPj,h ≤ Sj ∀j → ζ̄j, (2.29)
qRj,h + q
P
j,h ≤ qj ∀j, h→ ν1j,h , (2.30)
qRj,h − qPj,h ≤ 0 ∀j, h→ ν2j,h . (2.31)
where a first order Taylor approximation is used for the quadratic losses. This results
in the linearization of the energy balance and reserve requirement constraints given
in (2.7) and (2.8). The iterative market clearing process for TDUn is described in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 : TDUn
Initialize d
P,(0)






n , and set r := 0
while ||m(r+1)n −m(r)n || > tolerance do






n , the TSO optimizes (2.6) subject
to (2.24), (2.25), (2.26)–(2.31) and simultaneously schedules QP,(r+1), QR,(r+1),
qP,(r+1), qR,(r+1).







and submits them to the TSO.
r := r + 1
end while
return qP , qR, QP , QR, λP , λR, λPn , λ
R
n
2.5.2 Decentralized Market Designs
In the decentralized designs, the market equilibrium is obtained through a converging
iterative and distributed algorithm, relying on information exchange between EVs and
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the system operators. In each iteration, the TSO solves an OPF problem that sched-
ules centralized generator energy and reserve quantities and calculates LMPs and
DLMPs for fixed energy and reserve schedules of EVs. Then, EVs or LAs respond to
updated tentative prices, and modify their energy and reserve schedules through solv-
ing a cost minimization/scheduling problem. In summary, the distributed algorithms
associated with decentralized market designs consist of Gauss Seidel iterations, where
the TSO clears the market with fixed EV schedules and EVs or LAs (depending on
the market design) respond to tentative prices.
In order to avoid oscillations, EV and LA scheduling problems are augmented with
regularization terms added to their objective function (Bertsekas, 1999). The iterative
process continues until convergence is achieved, that is, until the total difference in
EV schedules between the current and most recent iteration approaches zero. Hence,
the iterative process that involves the TSO solving a Transmission OPF given EV
schedules to determine DLMPs, and the EVs that respond to DLMPs by optimally
solving their scheduling problems falls into the broad category of proximal algorithms
for which we can achieve system cost reduction at each iteration (Bertsekas, 1999).
EV self-scheduling is tantamount to parallelizing the market clearing process. In
fact, the centralized TDUn design clears to the same equilibrium as the information
unaware decentralized design (EVindUn), hence amenable to parallelization. Another
significant advantage of decentralized market designs is privacy concerns; EV owners
do not need to communicate their preferences directly to the TSO.
In this thesis, the following decentralized market designs are considered:
(i) Feeder information unaware EVs individually self-scheduling: EVindUn ,
(ii) Feeder information aware EVs individually self-scheduling: EVindA ,
(iii) EVs in the same feeder are scheduled by a single, feeder information aware LA:
EVaggA , and
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(iv) EVs in the same feeder are scheduled by multiple, feeder information aware LAs,
where each EV can belong to a single LA group: EVaggsA .
Information unaware LA market designs, including single or multiple aggrega-
tors, are not considered, since these designs are analytically identical hence reach an
identical market equilibrium as the EVindUn design. In fact, load aggregation does not
provide EVs with any leverage in impacting prices through marginal losses in the lack
of distribution feeder information (i.e., the functional form of marginal losses mn,h).
Information unaware EV self-scheduling (EVindUn)
In the EVindUn decentralized design, EVs do not have access to the functional form of
marginal losses hence cannot influence the LMP-DLMP relationships given in (2.21)
and (2.22). As such, EVs are price takers that self-schedule their energy and reserve
quantities with the purpose of minimizing their net charging costs.
At iteration r, upon receiving the tentative LMPs from the TSO and the value
of marginal losses from the DSO, EV j estimates DLMPs according to (2.21) and



























qPj,h ≥ sj → ζj, (2.33)∑
h
qPj,h ≤ Sj → ζ̄j, (2.34)
qRj,h + q
P
j,h ≤ qj ∀h→ ν1j,h , (2.35)
qRj,h − qPj,h ≤ 0 ∀h→ ν2j,h . (2.36)




zero upon convergence and facilitates convergence through avoiding oscillations during
the iterative process (Bertsekas, 1999). The TSO then solves an OPF problem, which
we refer to as TUn, since the TSO now only clears the transmission market and


















































i,h ≤ Qi, QPi,h −QRi,h ≥ Qi ∀i, h, (2.40)
The distributed algorithm which describes the market clearing of the EVindUn de-
centralized market design, is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 : EVindUn (Distributed Algorithm)
Initialize LMPs λP,(0), λR,(0), marginal losses m
(0)







j,h || > tolerance do
Step 1. ∀j ∈ J , EV j synthesizes λP,(r)n , λR,(r)n given λP,(r), λR,(r), and m(r)n
according to (2.21) and (2.22).
Step 2. ∀j ∈ J , EV j optimizes (2.32), subject to (2.11)–(2.14), given




j , and submits them to the DSO;




n,h according to (2.2)
and (2.3), and submits them to the TSO;
Step 4. Given qP,(r+1), qR,(r+1), m
(r+1)
n,h , and L
(r+1)
n,h , the TSO solves TUn, mini-
mizing (2.37), subject to (2.38), (2.39), (2.40), and determines λP,(r+1), λR,(r+1).
r := r + 1
end while




Information aware EV self-scheduling (EVindA )
In the EVindA decentralized market design, EVs are feeder information aware, meaning
that they know the functional form of marginal losses, mn,h. As such, they are able to
anticipate how their own and other EVs’ actions impact the distribution component




h . Information aware

















j,h − λRh qRj,h
)
+δ(qPj,h)







qPj,h ≥ sj → ζj, (2.42)∑
h
qPj,h ≤ Sj → ζ̄j, (2.43)
qRj,h + q
P
j,h ≤ qj ∀h→ ν1j,h , (2.44)
qRj,h − qPj,h ≤ 0 ∀h→ ν2j,h . (2.45)

















Since the optimal schedule of EV j depends on its own and neighboring EV
schedules, the equilibrium can be studied in the Nash Equilibrium context.
The distributed algorithm, which describes the market-clearing of the EVindA de-
centralized market design, is summarized in Algorithm 3. It differs from Algorithm
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−j,h). More precisely, EV j can infer the sum of total neighboring
EV load and inelastic consumption, qP−j,h + d
f
n,h, when it is given the value of mn,h.
EVj can then use this information when solving the self-scheduling problem given in
(2.41)-(2.45), assuming qP−j,h will be equal to the previous iteration’s value deduced
from the most recent value of mn,h. More formally, information aware EVs engage in
a best response iterative action.
Algorithm 3 : EVindA (Distributed Algorithm)
Initialize LMPs λP,(0), λR,(0), marginal losses m
(0)







j,h || > tolerance do
Step 1. ∀j ∈ J , EV j calculates dfn + q
P,(r)
−j given the functional form and value
of m
(r)
n according to (2.3).
Step 2. ∀j ∈ J , EV j optimizes (2.41), subject to (2.11)–(2.14), given
λP,(r), λR,(r), dfn + q
P,(r)




j , and submits them
to the DSO;
Steps 3-4. Repeat Steps 3-4 of Algorithm 2.
r := r + 1
end while
return qP , qR, QP , QR, λP , λR, λPn , λ
R
n
Information aware single LA scheduling (EVaggA )
In the EVaggA decentralized design, a single LA schedules all EVs connected to a dis-
tribution feeder. Information aware LAs, similar to information aware self-scheduling
EVs, can infer the value of the arguments of mn,h(Σjq
P
j,h) impacting the distribution
component of energy and reserve DLMPs. Upon receiving LMPs, the LA at feeder n





















qPj,h ≥ sj ∀j → ζj, (2.47)∑
h
qPj,h ≤ Sj ∀j → ζ̄j, (2.48)
qRj,h + q
P
j,h ≤ qj ∀j, h→ ν1j,h , (2.49)
qRj,h − qPj,h ≤ 0 ∀j, h→ ν2j,h . (2.50)
The objective function couples all EVs that are located in the same feeder. The
EVaggA decentralized market design is summarized in Algorithm 4. It is similar to the
EVindA design with the exception that in Step 1, LA at feeder n only needs to infer
dfn, and in Step 2, EVs at the same feeder are simultaneously scheduled by the LA.
Algorithm 4 : EVaggA (Distributed Algorithm)
Initialize LMPs λP,(0), λR,(0), marginal losses m
(0)







j,h || > tolerance do




Step 2. LA minimizes (2.46), subject to (2.11)–(2.14) ∀j ∈ J , given λP,(r), λR,(r),
dfn, and updates q
P,(r+1) and qR,(r+1), and submits them to the DSO;
Steps 3-4. Repeat Steps 3-4 of Algorithm 2.
r := r + 1
end while
Information aware multiple LA scheduling (EVaggsA )
This decentralized market design consists of multiple LAs in a single feeder scheduling
groups of EVs, where each EV j can only belong to a single LA group k. We remind
that Jk denotes the set of EVs that are scheduled by LA k, and the vector qPk =
{qPj,h|∀j ∈ Jk,∀h}. At iteration r, LA k at feeder n solves the following scheduling

























qPj,h ≥ sj ∀j ∈ Jk → ζj, (2.52)∑
h
qPj,h ≤ Sj ∀j ∈ Jk → ζ̄j, (2.53)
qRj,h + q
P
j,h ≤ qj ∀j ∈ Jk, h→ ν1j,h , (2.54)
qRj,h − qPj,h ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ Jk, h→ ν2j,h . (2.55)









−k,h) couples all EV groups in feeder
n. Therefore, multiple LAs in the same feeder engage in a non-cooperative game and
the resulting equilibrium is a Nash Equilibrium. At each iteration r, LA k schedules
EVs given the total optimal energy and reserve quantities of EVs in other LAs, qP−k,h.
The distributed algorithm associated with multiple LA market design is given in
Algorithm 5:
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Algorithm 5 : EVaggsA (Distributed Algorithm)
Initialize LMPs λP,(0), λR,(0), marginal losses m
(0)







j,h || > tolerance do
Step 1. ∀k, LA k calculates dfn + q
P,(r)
−k given the functional form and value of
m
(r)
n according to (2.3);
Step 2. ∀k, LA k optimizes (2.51), subject to (2.11)–(2.14) ∀j ∈ Jk, given
λP,(r), λR,(r), dfn + q
P,(r)




k , and submits them to
the DSO;
Steps 3-4. Repeat Steps 3-4 of Algorithm 2.
r := r + 1
end while
In the following section, we provide equilibrium conditions of all market designs
that are obtained by the first order optimality conditions. The equilibrium conditions
provide insight to analytical differences among market designs.
2.6 Comparison of Equilibrium Conditions Across Market
Designs
In this section, we study the differences in the centralized and decentralized mar-
ket designs by comparing the necessary first order optimality conditions w.r.t. EV
decisions qPj,h and q
R
j,h.
Since generators are scheduled by the TSO in all market designs, the optimality
conditions w.r.t. generator variables QPi,h and Q
R
i,h are identical across centralized and
decentralized market designs.






λPh (1 +mn,h)− λRh γn
∑
j∈Jn,h
qRj,h + A = 0, (2.56)
−λRn,h + ν1j,h + ν2j,h = 0, (2.57)
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where A = 2δqPj,h − ζj + ζj + ν
1
j,h − ν2j,h.
With the relaxed energy balance constraint given in (2.15) in the centralized mar-
ket design, the following expressions are obtained from taking the optimality condi-
tions with respect to generator variables QPi,h and Q
R
i,h:
cPi − λPh + Υi,h −Υi,h = 0, ∀i, h (2.58)
cRi − λRh + Υi,h + Υi,h = 0, ∀i, h (2.59)
From (2.59), it is clear that as long as the generator reserve marginal cost cRi is
positive, reserve balance constraint given in (2.8) is binding and reserve price λR is
positive. Optimality condition given in (2.58) implies that if generator minimum gen-
eration constraint is non-binding for at least one generator, then the energy balance
constraint is also binding since energy price λP > 0. We argue that this in fact true,
since the hourly reserve requirement is only a portion of the hourly system demand.
Given that the optimality conditions show the reserve balance constraint is binding
and; ∑
i








it is clear that there must exist generators for each h where QPh > Q
R
h . Hence, from
(2.58), Υi,h = 0 and λ
P
h > 0.
The optimality condition in (2.57) is identical across all market designs, hence, we
present optimality conditions w.r.t. qPj,h only. For the TDUn market design we have:
λPn,h + A = 0. (2.60)
For the distribution feeder information-Unaware decentralized market design EVindUn ,
we obtain exactly the same optimality conditions as above. This is not surprising,
since we can observe by inspection that its clearing process is an exact decomposition
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of the centralized market design TDUn. The distribution feeder information-Aware
decentralized design EVindA yields:




j,h − λRh γnqRj,h + A = 0. (2.61)
The decentralized market design with multiple EV LAs with feeder information,
EVaggsA , yields:





qPj,h − λRh γn
∑
j
qRj,h + A = 0. (2.62)
Optimality conditions (2.56)-(2.62) reveal non-matching terms that imply differ-
ences in the market equilibria. Interestingly, the above conditions also reveal that
differences in market equilibria persists even in the absence of regulation reserves as
a market commodity, with the exception that the social welfare maximizing central-
ized market design, TDA, becomes identical to information unaware decentralized
market designs. That is, under energy being the single market commodity and lack
of information access, self-scheduling or load aggregator scheduling does not impact
the market outcome and their associated equilibria are efficient.
The following proposition describes a major difference in the scheduling decisions
across the decentralized designs.
Proposition 2.6.1 (Key impact of decentralized designs on scheduling de-





EVaggsA . At the equilibrium, assume that the minimum daily charging demand con-
straint (2.11) is binding. Then, for given hours h, h′ with qPj,h > 0, the marginal cost
reduction associated with moving infinitesimal consumption away from hour h is equal
to the increase in marginal cost associated with moving infinitesimal consumption into
hour h′. Moreover, the marginal change in cost in hour h associated with moving con-
sumption away from hour h is given by the following, assuming the optimal solution
satisfies qRj,h = qj − qPj,h:
• EVindUn : λPn,h + λRn,h + 2δqPj,h,
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• EVindA : (λPh + λRh )[γnqPj,h + 1 +mn,h(qP−j,h, qPj,h)] + 2δqPj,h,




















Proof. For the purpose of this proof, we transform the multi-commodity EV schedul-
ing problems to a single-commodity one that are written only in terms of qPj,h.
Note that reserve quantity qRj,h either increases with energy consumption q
P
j,h if
constraint (2.13) is not binding, or decreases if constraint (2.14) is not binding. If the
former is true, then (i) ν1j,h = 0 and, (ii)
∂qRj,h
∂qPj,h
= 1. In that case, rearrangement of the
optimality conditions w.r.t. qPj,h and q
P
j,h′ yields the following expressions for each j:
• EVindUn : ∆λn,h + 2δqPj,h = ∆λn,h′ + 2δqPj,h′ ,
• EVindA : ∆λh[γnqPj,h + 1 +mn,h(qP−j,h, qPj,h)] + 2δqPj,h =
∆λh′ [γnq
P



















































where ∆λh = λ
P
h − λRh and ∆λn,h = λPn,h − λRn,h.
On the other hand, if reserve quantity decreases with energy consumption, then
(i) ν2j,h = 0 and (ii)
∂qRj,h
∂qPj,h
= −1. Rearranging the optimality conditions w.r.t. qPj,h and
qPj,h′ yields the following expressions for each j:
• EVindUn : λPn,h + λRn,h + 2δqPj,h = λPn,h′ + λRn,h′ + 2δqPj,h′ ,









































































The equality of marginal cost reduction in hour h and the marginal cost increase in
hour h′ is thus shown explicitly by expressing qRj,h in terms of q
P
j,h.
Proposition 2.6.1 shows the difference among decentralized market designs in
terms of the marginal costs perceived by individual EVs or LAs when they trans-
fer charging from hour h to hour h′. The differences depend on whether EVs or the
LAs have access to distribution feeder information. In the EVindUn design, EVs have no
information on how they can impact marginal losses, mn,h, and the resulting DLMPs
that derive their energy and reserve scheduling decisions, whereas in the EVindA de-





individual self-scheduling EVs can impact marginal losses mn,h and the DLMPs only
by shifting accross hours their own consumption qPj,h, whereas in the EV
agg
A design,
the single LA has a greater leverage in impacting marginal losses mn,h by schedul-




j,h. In summary, Proposition
2.6.1 provides an intuitive insight to the key source of differences in market-clearing
equilibria under decentralized market designs.
2.7 Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium of EV
Schedules in the Decentralized Market Designs
The prices (DLMPs) in the objective function of self-scheduling EVs in the EVindUn
and EVindA decentralized designs, characterized by (2.32) and (2.41), respectively, in
addition to their own energy and reserve decisions, also depend on the total hourly en-
ergy consumption by other EVs connected to the same feeder. Similarly, the DLMPs
in the objective function of LA k given in (2.51) in the multiple LA market design
EVaggsA is a function of total EV consumption in other LA groups.
Therefore, for given LMPs, self-scheduling EVs in the EVindUn and EV
ind
A decen-
tralized market designs and multiple LAs in the EVaggsA market design engage in a
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non-cooperative game. In addition, the associated equilibrium of EV schedules can
be analyzed in a Nash equilibrium context (Basar and Olsder, 1999).
To this end, we study existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of EV schedules
in decentralized information aware and unaware market designs.
The fact that the proposed market designs are associated with a multi-commodity
market and EVs or LAs co-optimize their energy consumption and reserve provision
quantities in the EVindA , EV
agg
A , and EV
aggs
A decentralized designs renders the char-
acterization and qualitative analysis of the multi-commodity scheduling problems a
difficult task. In fact, the associated objective functions (2.41), (2.46), and (2.51) are
non-convex due to bilinear qPj,hq
R
j,h terms in the cost functions that render the Hes-
sian of these functions indefinite. However, by reducing the scheduling problems to
single-commodity problems involving explicitly only the energy decisions qPj,h, input
space partitions where the scheduling problems become convex can be identified. We
address this by following the below tasks:
• We rely on the coupling of energy and reserve decisions, that are coupled through
constraints imposed by the fact that reserves are bidirectional (up and down)
and can neither exceed the battery charging rate, qPj,h, nor the remaining charg-
ing rate capacity, qj − qPj,h.
• We partition the input space to mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets.
Within each subset, we exploit the first order optimality conditions presented
in Section 2.6 and dual feasibility in order to express reserve decisions qRj,h in
terms of energy decisions qPj,h, and thus reduce the multi-commodity problems
to single-commodity ones,
• We construct appropriate potential functions (Voorneveld, 2000) that convert
individual EV decisions to a centralized strictly convex problem within each
partition, from which the equilibrium of EV schedules can be recovered,
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• We provide an alternative proof for each decentralized market design to show
equilibrium uniqueness through the conditions provided in (Rosen, 1965).
In the EVaggA market design, where EVs are scheduled by a single information
aware LA, there is no concept of a Nash Equilibrium; all EVs in the same feeder
are scheduled within the same LA group, hence, there is no competition among EVs.
Then, the task of proving uniqueness of EV schedules reduces to showing that the
EVaggA optimization problem is strictly convex within each input space partition.
The following lemmas provide important characteristics with regards to the opti-
mal solutions of the scheduling problems, and allow conversion of the multi-commodity
problems to single commodity ones.




A , and EV
aggs
A decentralized mar-
ket designs. For the EV scheduling problems solved in Step 2 of Algorithms 2, 3, 4,
and 5 respectively, the optimal solution satisfies the following:
(i) At least one of constraints (2.13) or (2.14) is binding, ∀j.
(ii) If ∃h such that qPj,h > 0 and λPh − λRh > 0, then constraint (2.11) is binding.
(iii) If ∃h such that qRj,h < qPj,h, then constraint (2.11) is binding.
(iv) If constraint (2.11) is not binding and ∃h such that constraint (2.13) is not
binding, then constraint (2.12) is binding.
Proof. (i) The result follows directly from the first order optimality conditions (2.57).
Since the equality is not satisfied when ν1j,h = ν
2
j,h = 0, at least one of these dual vari-
ables must be nonzero, assuming that λRh > 0,∀h. We do not consider the unlikely
case where system reserve requirement is zero or all of reserve provision is satisfied
by zero cost resources, that is λRh = 0.
(ii) The result follows from (2.60) for EVindUn , from (2.61) for EV
ind
A and from (2.62)
for EVaggA . Note that ζj is positive when ∆λh = λ
P
h − λRh > 0. Hence, the minimum





(iii) When qRj,h < q
P
j,h, constraint (2.14) is not binding and ν
2
j,h = 0. Then, com-
bining (2.57) and optimality conditions with respect to qPj,h, we obtain the following
expressions for ζ
j
for each market design:
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• EVindA : ζj = λ
P
h (1 +mn,h) + λ
R
h (1 +mn,h) + γn(λ
P qPj,h − λRh qRj,h) + 2δqPj,h + ζj,






































Therefore, in all of the expressions above for each market design, it can easily be
verified that ζ
j
> 0. Hence, constraint (2.11) is binding in the optimal solutions of
the scheduling problems in each market design.
(iv) The result follows from combining (2.57) and optimality conditions with respect
to qPj,h for the scheduling problems in each market design: When ζj = ν
2
j,h = 0, we
obtain:
• EVindA : ζj = −∆λh + γn(λRh qRj,h − λPh qPj,h)− 2δqPj,h,
• EVindUn : ζj = −∆λh − 2δqPj,h,


















Since a non-binding constraint (2.11) implies ∆λh = λ
R
h − λPh > 0, we conclude
that ζj > 0 for all the expressions listed above for each market design, and constraint
(2.12) is binding.
The following corollary immediately follows from Lemma 2.7.1.i :
Corollary 2.7.1.1. The reserve decision of EV j at hour h satisfies the following:
qRj,h =
qPj,h, if qPj,h <
qj
2




Note that when qPj,h =
qj
2
, the two conditions in Corollary 2.7.1.1 are identical.
Lemma 2.7.1.ii implies that if the EV is required to charge during an hour such
that the energy LMP is higher than the reserve LMP, total charging is equal to
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minimum charging demand sj, since the total cost increases if the battery charges
beyond this level. The reverse direction of Lemma 2.7.1.ii is also intuitive; if the
minimum charging demand constraint (2.11) is not binding, then one can show that
the hours when the battery charges satisfy λPh − λRh < 0, i.e., the minimum charging
demand is exceeded only in the case EV charges during hours when the reserve prices
exceed energy prices. When constraint (2.11) is not binding, constraint (2.14) is
binding ∀h, hence, qRj,h = qPj,h, ∀h.
If reserve LMPs exceed energy LMPs, the battery will charge up to its maximum





suggests that reaching maximum total charging capacity is feasible.
Corollary 2.7.1.1 shows that the relationship between reserves and energy con-




addition, whether EV j needs to charge more than
qj
2
during an hour h depends on
the relationship between the ratio
sj
qj
and the number of hours that the EV is plugged
in, Tj. This motivates the definition of the following input space partitions:









implying that EV j does not need to charge more than
qj
2
in any hour to meet
its minimum charging demand. Therefore, qPj,h <
qj
2
,∀h is a feasible solution. It
is later shown that under a mild assumption this holds at equilibrium.









Figure 2·4: Illustration of the charging flexibility levels for a two-hour
problem. HF=High Flexibility, MF=Moderate Flexibility, LF=Low
Flexibility. This figure was originally published in (Yanikara et al.,
2019).
implying that EV j needs to charge more than
qj
2
during at least one hour.
• Low Charging Flexibility : EV j needs to charge more than qj
2
every hour to
fulfill its charging demand, i.e., its charging demand sj satisfies:







∀h, qRj,h = qj − qPj,h,∀h by Corollary 2.7.1.1.
The charging flexibility levels are illustrated in Figure 2·4 for a two-hour problem. In
this case, High Flexibility is satisfied when the minimum charging demand, sj, does
not exceed qj.
To proceed with the proof of equilibrium existence and uniqueness for decentral-
ized information unaware and aware market designs, the following reasonable input
assumptions are made:
Assumption 1. λPh > 0, λ
R






We assume both energy and reserve LMPs are nonnegative, and energy LMPs
are higher than reserve LMPs. Although negative energy prices can be common
in markets with high renewable penetration and tax subsidies 3, we assume there
is no overbidding from renewable generators due to production tax credits. Our
analytical results show that regulation prices are positive as long as not all of the
reserve requirement is provided by free resources that have zero reserve provision
cost. In fact, an analysis of a year long 2019 PJM energy and regulation reserve LMP
data set (PJM, 2019) shows that out of 8760 hours, λPh ≤ 0 for two hours and λRh = 0
for 39 hours. As a measure of the significance of reserve prices, the same data set
shows a median value of 0.51 and an average value of 1.1, for the proportion of reserve
LMPs to energy LMPs.
Even though reserve LMPs can exceed energy LMPs significantly during certain
hours due to high renewable penetration, we restrict our input space to the case where
energy LMPs are higher than reserve LMPs. This assumption is required to guarantee
convexity of EV scheduling problems under High Charging Flexibility only. Later in
section 2.7.2 we show that scheduling problems under Moderate or Low Charging
Flexibility are convex regardless of the sign of λP −λR, as long as λP > 0 and λR > 0.
In the aforementioned year-long PJM data set, reserve LMPs exceed energy LMPs
during 15% of the hours.




h − λRh , ∀h, h′|h′ 6= h.
Similar to Assumption 1, Assumption 2 relies on the anticipated increase in reserve
prices due to renewable energy penetration. Since hourly marginal losses on distri-





increases with increasing reserve prices, we assume that Assumption 2 holds for dis-
3In CAISO market, duration of negative prices in the 5-minute market has reached 15% in April,
2017 (CAISO, 2018).
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n,h − λRn,h, ∀h, h′|h′ 6= h, (2.66)
implying that charging more than
qj
2
is not optimal unless it is required for feasibility.
The marginal cost of charging beyond
qj
2
at hour h is equal to λPn,h + λ
R
n,h, since an
additional unit of energy consumption requires one less unit of reserve provision due
to constraint (2.13). On the other hand, the marginal cost of charging when qPj,h <
qj
2
equals to λPn,h−λRn,h. Therefore, as long as the marginal cost of charging when qPj,h >
qj
2
is greater than when qPj,h <
qj
2
, ∀h, h′ pairs, it is not optimal to charge more than qj
2
at
any hour.4 Analysis of the year-long PJM energy and reserve LMP data set reveals
that Assumption 2 holds fro 90% of the hours (PJM, 2019), after removing hours
with zero reserve LMP.
In the following analysis, it is assumed that EVs belong to the same charging
flexibility category, but their actual minimum charging demand values may differ.
The following two theorems are restatements of known results on the existence
and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium that are employed in our analysis.
Theorem 2.7.2 (Nash Equilibrium Existence). Given a game with a set of play-
ers J = {1, .., J} where player j ∈ J has a strategy qj ∈ Sj and a cost function
fj(qj, q−j) : S1 × S2 × . . .× SJ → R, a Nash equilibrium exists if fj(qj, q−j) is strictly
convex in qj, continuous in both qj and q−j, and Sj ⊂ Rmj is convex, closed and
bounded ∀j, where mj is the dimension of player j’s strategy.
Proof. Theorem 2.7.2 is a restatement of Theorem 1 in (Rosen, 1965).
Theorem 2.7.3 (Nash Equilibrium Uniqueness). For the game described in The-
orem 2.7.2, given a strictly convex function P (qP1 , . . . , q
P
j , . . . , q
P










P (qP1 , . . . , q
P
j , . . . , q
P
J ),
4If (2.66) does not hold, an EV might decide to provide no reserve or strictly smaller reserve than
qPj,h. For instance, for a two-hour case where {λPn,1, λRn,1} = {20, 15}, {λPn,2, λRn,2} = {50, 10}, qj =
3, sj = 3, the optimal solution is q
P












−j) is bounded ∀j, and P
is smooth on S1 × . . . × SJ . Moreover, strict convexity of P implies a unique Nash
Equilibrium.
Proof. Theorem 2.7.3 is a restatement of known results in (Voorneveld, 2000) and
(Monderer and Shapley, 1996). Theorem 2.7.3 relies on constructing a potential
function in order to show uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) of the EV and Load
Aggregator games in EVindUn , EV
ind
A , and EV
aggs
A decentralized market designs. A
game in strategic form is called a potential game if the change in the payoff of a
player with respect to a change in strategy is equal to the change in the potential
function due to a unilateral change of strategy of the same player. More formally, a
game where each player j has payoff function fj(qj, q−j), is a potential game if there
is a function P that satisfies the following for qj ∈ Sj:
fj(qj, q−j)− fj(q′j, q−j) = P (qj)− P (q′j), ∀j, q′j ∈ Sj.
The function P that couples all players is referred to as the potential function.
The relation between the N.E. condition and the optimization problem with objective
function replaced by P is based on (Voorneveld, 2000, Definition 1). The conditions
under which the N.E. is unique are provided by (Neyman, 1997, Theorem 2) and
restated in (Caruso et al., 2018). In fact (see (Caruso et al., 2018)), the diagonal strict
convexity condition for equilibrium uniqueness given by (Rosen, 1965, Theorem 2)
is satisfied when the potential function is strictly convex. We additionally prove the
diagonal strict convexity condition for all the EV and LA games defined in Section
2.7 as an alternative proof.
It is stated in (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) that there is no clear economic
interpretation of the potential function, in other words, the function that players
jointly maximize.
2.7.1 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium under High Charging
Flexibility
We start this section by showing in the following Lemma the coupling between en-
ergy and reserve decisions that holds for all hours, under High Charging Flexibility.
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Using the result of the following Lemma, we then transform the multi-commodity EV
scheduling problem to a single-commodity one, where energy consumption is the only
decision.
Lemma 2.7.4 (Single-Commodity, High Charging Flexibility). Under High
Charging Flexibility, and Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal solution of the EV schedul-




A , and EV
aggs
A decentralized






Proof. We prove the result by contradiction for all the market designs. Assume the
opposite is true, i.e., ∃h s.t. qPj,h >
qj
2
. By Assumption 1 and Lemma 2.7.1(ii),∑
h q
P
j,h = sj. Then, given (2.63), there should exist some hour h




each market design, comparing the expressions of ζ
j
obtained from the first order
optimality conditions associated with qPj,h and q
P
j,h′ , we get:








j,h − λRh qRj,h) + 2δqPj,h + ζj, and
ζ
j




j,h′ − λRh′qRj,h′) + 2δqPj,h′ + ζj.






j,h + ζj, and
ζ
j
= ∆λn,h′ + 2δq
P
j,h′ + ζj.
































































For the EVindA , EV
aggs
A , and EV
agg
A designs, we rely on Assumption 2 that states
(λPh + λ
R
h )(1 +mn,h) > ∆λh′(1 +mn,h′). Note that for EV
ind







j,h) include energy and reserve quantities of a single EV j only. Hence, these
quantities, including the degradation term, are small enough, implying that the two
expressions for ζ
j
obtained from optimality conditions with respect to h and h′ cannot





extremely unlikely that λPn,h+λ
R
n,h = ∆λn,h′ holds; the total load each hour, d
f
n,h, differs
by a small number, ε, from other hours, hence the prices as well. For the single Load
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As the number of EVs scheduled by Load Aggregator k in the multiple load aggregator












Therefore, for all of the above, we conclude that ζ
j
values obtained from optimality
conditions with respect to h and h′ cannot be identical, hence, the optimal solution




Having shown qPj,h ≤
qj
2
in the Lemma above, we can also conclude qRj,h = q
P
j,h, ∀h,
by Corollary 2.7.1.1. We proceed by providing the transformed scheduling problems
that can now be written only in terms of energy decisions for all market designs.
For the EVindA design, the self-scheduling problem solved by EV j (Step 2 of


































j,h ≥ sj} is the feasible set under High Charging
Flexibility (HF) and ∆λh = λ
P
h −λRh . We refer to ∆λh as the effective price (LMP) of




j,h = sj by Lemma 2.7.1.ii, maximum total charging
capacity constraint (2.12) can be omitted.
Similarly, for the EVindUn design, the EV self-scheduling problem solved by EV j
























j ) is only a function of q
P
j .
For the EVaggA design, the scheduling problem solved by the single LA at feeder
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The EV and LA games in the decentralized market designs under High Charging
Flexibility are defined formally below:
Definition 2.7.1 (Information unaware EV game, High Charging Flexi-
bility). Information unaware EVs in the EVindUn market design engage in a non-





given in (2.68) and strategy set SHFj . Any Nash Equilibrium of the game, denoted









j |m∗n),∀qPj ∈ SHFj .
Definition 2.7.2 (Information aware EV game, High Charging Flexibility).
Information aware EVs in the EVindA market design engage in a non-cooperative







in (2.67) and strategy set SHFj . Any Nash Equilibrium of the game, denoted by q
P∗,













−j ),∀qPj ∈ SHFj .
Definition 2.7.3 (Information aware LA game, High Charging Flexibility).
Information aware LAs in the EVaggsA market design engage in a non-cooperative game







(2.70) and strategy set SHFk . Any Nash Equilibrium of the game, denoted by q
P∗,













−k), ∀qPk ∈ SHFk .
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The next proposition shows the existence and uniqueness of N.E. in the aforemen-
tioned EV and LA games.
Proposition 2.7.1 (Existence and and Uniqueness of N.E. under High Charg-
ing Flexibility). Under High Charging Flexibility, and Assumptions 1 and 2, a
unique Nash Equilibrium exists for the EV and LA games in EVindA , EV
ind
Un , and
EVaggsA decentralized market designs, described by Algorithms 2, 3, and 5.
Proof. We first show existence of N.E. in the EVindUn , EV
ind
A , and EV
aggs
A market
designs by showing (i) The feasible set SHFj and S
HF
k of EV j and Load Aggregator k
in the EV scheduling problems, under High Charging Flexibility, is closed, bounded,







k of EV j and Load Aggregator k are all strictly convex and continuous in q
P
j .

















−k) given in (2.67), (2.68), and (2.70) are strictly convex





We show Part i as the following: Without the inter-temporal minimum charging




]. Therefore, the feasible set of EV j without constraint (2.11), denoted by
Sj, is given by Sj = S
1
j × . . .× S
h







] and h is the number
of periods EVs are plugged in. Therefore, Sj is closed and bounded. The feasible set
in the presence of constraint (2.11), SHFj , is then a closed subset of Sj, hence also
bounded. SHFj is also convex, since the constraints are linear. The closed, bounded,
and convex properties of the feasible set of Load Aggregator k, SHFk , can be shown
similarly.
Next, we show the potential functions and their strict convexity for each of the
EV and Load Aggregator games in EVindUn , EV
ind
A , and EV
aggs
A market designs. Con-
sider the EVindA market design. The potential function P
EVindA for the game with
information-aware EVs, where EV j has the cost function f
EVindA
j in (2.67) and strat-
egy set SHFj , is given by:
P


























The J × J Hessian matrix of the potential function PEV
ind
A (qPh ) in (2.71) for a given




2∆λhγn + 2δ ∆λhγn ∆λhγn . . . ∆λhγn∆λhγn 2∆λhγn + 2δ ∆λhγn . . . ∆λhγn... ... ... . . . ...
∆λhγn ∆λhγn ∆λhγn . . . 2∆λhγn + 2δ
 ,
which can be written as the sum of a positive semi-definite matrix and the identity
matrix multiplied by a positive scalar. Since the identity matrix is positive definite,
and the sum of a positive semi-definite and positive definite matrix is also positive
definite, Hh is positive definite. Hence, the potential function P
EVindA in (2.71) is
strictly convex in qPj,h,∀j, which guarantees a unique optimal solution.
We proceed to show that the N.E. can be recovered by minimizing the potential
function P
EVindA subject to SHFj ,∀j. That is, first order optimality conditions that
characterize the N.E. are identical to the optimality conditions of the potential func-
tion minimization problem. N.E. conditions that are characterized by the first order
optimality condition of the EV scheduling problem in the EVindA market design (Step
2 of Algorithm 3) w.r.t. qPj,h can be written as:




j,h − ζj + ν
1
j,h = 0. (2.72)
The optimality condition w.r.t. qPj,h of the potential function minimization problem
(2.71) is written as:






j,h −∆λhγqP−j,h − ζj + ν
1
j,h = 0. (2.73)
By inspection, optimality conditions (2.72) and (2.73) are identical. Hence, by The-
orem 2.7.3, the Nash equilibrium of the EV game in the EVindA market design, under
High Charging Flexibility, is unique.
Consider the EVindUn market design. The potential function P
EVindUn for the game




and strategy set SHFj , is given by:
P





























The Hessian of P




∆λhγn + 2δ ∆λhγn ∆λhγn . . . ∆λhγn∆λhγn ∆λhγn + 2δ ∆λhγn . . . ∆λhγn... ... ... . . . ...
∆λhγn ∆λhγn ∆λhγn . . . ∆λhγn + 2δ
 ,
Given Assumption 1, the Hessian is positive definite. Thus, P
EVindUn is strictly convex
in qPj,h,∀j. It can easily be showed that the N.E. conditions and optimality conditions
of potential function P
EVindUn minimization problem are identical. Hence, by Theo-
rem 2.7.3, the Nash equilibrium of the EV game EVindUn market design, under High
Charging Flexibility, is unique.
Finally, consider the EVaggsA market design. The potential function P
EVaggsA for
the Load Aggregator game where the Load Aggregator k has the cost function f
EVaggsA
j
in (2.70) and strategy set SHFk , is written as:
P























The Hessian of P




2∆λhγn + 2δ 2∆λhγn 2∆λhγn . . . 2∆λhγn2∆λhγn 2∆λhγn + 2δ 2∆λhγn . . . 2∆λhγn... ... ... . . . ...




EVindUn , the above Hessian can be written as the sum of a
positive definite and positive semi definite matrix. Therefore, P
EVaggsA (qPk ) is strictly
convex and the optimal solution is unique.
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In the following, we provide an alternative proof to show uniqueness of the N.E. of
EV and Load Aggregator games in the above market designs. The alternative proof





which is an equilibrium uniqueness condition provided by (Rosen, 1965, Theorem 2).
We summarize the uniqueness theorem as the following:
Theorem 2.7.5 (N.E. Uniqueness for N-player games (Rosen, 1965)). Con-
sider the game described in Theorem 2.7.2, and assume each player j’s cost function
fj(qj, q−j) is continuous in q = {qj,∀j} and convex in qj for fixed q−j. Then, the
described game possesses a unique N.E., if the function σ(q, r) defined below is diag-




rjfj(qj, q−j), rj ≥ 0,∀j. (2.76)
The diagonal strict convexity of σ(q, r) is satisfied when the matrix G(q, r) +
GT (q, r) is positive definite where G(q, r) is the Jacobian of the following vector








Let rj = 1,∀j, for the resulting G(q, r) +GT (q, r) matrices provided below for all
the market designs. We also define the following matrices for each EV j:
Aj = diag(4∆λ1γn, . . . , 4∆λTγn), Bj = diag(2∆λ1γn, . . . , 2∆λTγn), Cj = 4δIT .
where T = 24 (hour). Then, for EVindA , G




(q, r) can be written
as; A1 + C1 B2 . . . BJB1 A2 + C2 . . . BJ... ... . . . ...
B2 B2 . . . AJ + CJ

The above JT × JT matrix can be written as the sum of an upper and a lower
triangular matrix with all the diagonal elements strictly positive, hence both matrices
being positive definite. Thus, GEV
ind




(q, r) is also positive definite
and the EV cost functions are diagonally strictly convex. By Theorem 2.7.5, N.E. is
unique.
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For EVindUn , G




(q, r) is given by:C1 0 . . . 00 C2 . . . 0... ... . . . ...
0 0 0 CJ

where 0 is a T ×T matrix with all the elements equal to zero. Since elements of Cj is
greater than zero, the above diagonal matrix has strictly positive eigenvalues, hence,
positive definite. We therefore conclude by Theorem 2.7.5 that N.E. of the EV game
in the EVindUn market design is unique.
Lastly, for EVaggsA with multiple load aggregators, we additionally define Dj =






where Jj is the load aggregator group that EV j belongs to.
GEV
aggs




(q, r) is given by:












j=J,h EJ,1 EJ,2 . . . AJ + CJ

where h = {1, . . . , h, . . . , T}. The rows associate with EV j and hour vector h is
marked in the above JT × JT matrix. Similar to EVindA , the above matrix can be
written as the sum of an upper and a lower triangular matrix with all the diagonal
elements greater than zero. Hence, GEV
aggs




(q, r) is positive definite
and N.E. of the multiple Load Aggregator game is unique, by Theorem 2.7.5.
EVs do not engage in a game where they are simultaneously scheduled by a single
LA in the EVaggA market design, hence there is no N.E. context. For the EV
agg
A
decentralized market design described by Algorithm 4, the objective is to show that
the LA response, consisting of the vector of all EV decisions, qP , is unique, which is
identical to showing that the scheduling problem solved by the single LA is strictly
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convex. This is in fact true since the cost function (2.69) is strictly convex under
Assumption 1 and the feasible set SHF consists of linear inequalities.
2.7.2 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium under Moderate and Low
Charging Flexibility
By the definition of Moderate Charging Flexibility (2.64), it is required that there
exists an hour h such that qPj,h >
qj
2




j,h = sj ac-
cording to Lemma 2.7.1.iii, regardless of the sign of ∆λh. Therefore, Assumption 1.ii
is not required for the result of Lemma below, which establishes the coupling between
energy and reserve decisions that holds ∀h, similar to High Charging Flexibility.
Lemma 2.7.6 (Single-Commodity, Moderate/Low Charging Flexibility).
Under Moderate/Low Charging Flexibility and Assumption 2, the optimal solution




A , and EV
aggs
A decen-






Proof. Similar to High Charging Flexibility, we prove the lemma by contradiction for








. We then use the same contradiction argument in High Charging Flexibility
in the opposite direction, and we show that the two expressions of ζ
j
cannot be
identical, for all market designs. Therefore, qPj,h ≥
qj
2
, ∀h. Under Low Charging
Flexibility, due to (2.65), qPj,h >
qj
2
, ∀h, regardless of Assumption 2 or 1.
By Corollary 2.7.1.1 and Lemma 2.7.6 above, the optimal solution also satisfies
qRj,h = qj − qPj,h. Then, in the EVindA design, the EV scheduling problem in Step 2
of Algorithm 3, under Moderate or Low Charging Flexibility, can be written only in
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j,h ≥ sj} is the feasible set associated with
Moderate/Low Charging Flexibility (MLF). Since λPh > 0 and λ
R
h > 0 by Assumption
1, the objective function above in (2.77) is strictly convex regardless of the sign of
∆λh.
Similarly, for the EVindUn , EV
agg
A , and EV
aggs
A designs, the EV and LA scheduling


























































The EV and LA games in decentralized market designs under Moderate or Low Charg-
ing Flexibility are defined next.
Definition 2.7.4 (Information unaware EV game, Moderate/Low Charging
Flexibility). Information unaware EVs with Moderate/Low Charging Flexibility in
the EVindUn market design engage in a non-cooperative game given LMPs, (λ
P , λR),

















j |m∗n),∀qPj ∈ SMLFj .
Definition 2.7.5 (Information aware EV game, Moderate/Low Charging
Flexibility). Information aware EVs with Moderate/Low Charging Flexibility in the
EVindA market design engage in a non-cooperative game for given LMPs, (λ
P , λR),






−j) given in (2.77) and strategy set
SMLFj . Any Nash Equilibrium of the game, denoted by q
P∗, satisfies the following













−j ),∀qPj ∈ SMLFj .
Definition 2.7.6 (Information aware LA game, Moderate/Low Charging
Flexibility). Information aware LAs in the EVaggsA market design engage in a non-







−k) given in (2.80) and strategy set S
MLF
k . Any Nash Equilibrium of the













−k),∀qPk ∈ SMLFk .
Proposition 2.7.2 (Existence and Uniqueness of N.E., Moderate/Low Charg-
ing Flexibility). Under Moderate or Low Charging Flexibility and Assumption 2, a
unique Nash Equilibrium exists for the EV and LA games in EVindA , EV
ind
Un , and
EVaggsA decentralized market designs, described by Algorithms 2, 3, and 5.
Proof. We first show the existence of N.E. in EVindA , EV
ind




(i) The feasible sets SMLFj and S
MLF
k of EV j and Load Aggregator k in the EV and
Load Aggregator scheduling problems, under Moderate or Low Charging Flexibility,
is closed, bounded, and convex. The convexity, closedness and boundedness of SMLFj













j , and f
EVaggsA
k of EV j and





Therefore, by Theorem 2.7.2, a N.E. exists for the EV and Load Aggregator games
in EVindA , EV
ind




Next, we show the potential functions and their strict convexity for each of the
EV and Load Aggregator games in EVindUn , EV
ind
A , and EV
aggs
A market designs, under
Moderate/Low Charging Flexibility.
Consider the EVindA market design. The potential function P
EVindA for the game





























The Hessian of the potential function P





2Σλhγn + 2δ Σλhγn . . . ΣλhγnΣλhγn 2Σλhγn + 2δ . . . Σλhγn... ... . . . ...
Σλhγn Σλhγn . . . 2Σλhγn + 2δ
 ,




h . The above Hessian can be written as H
EVindA
h = (2δ +
Σλhγn)IJ + Σλhγn1J .
Since Σλh > 0, the first term is positive definite and the second term is posi-
tive semidefinite. Therefore, H
EVindA
h is positive definite and P
EVindA is strictly con-
vex. Thus, potential function minimization problem has a unique optimal solution.
Uniqueness of N.E. is then shown by identical optimality conditions of the potential
function minimization problem and equilibrium conditions of the EV game that are
characterized by first order optimality conditions. The first order optimality condition
of the EV scheduling problem (Step 2 of Algorithm 3) w.r.t. qPj,h is given by:
(λPh + λ
R
h )(1 +mn,h + γq
P
j,h)− γλRh qj + 2δqPj,h − ζj + ν
1
j,h = 0. (2.82)
It can easily be shown that the optimality condition of the potential function P
EVindA
in (2.81) w.r.t. qPj,h is identical to (2.82).
Consider the EVindUn market design. The potential function P
EVindUn for the game
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The Hessian of the potential function P





Σλhγn + 2δ Σλhγn . . . ΣλhγnΣλhγn Σλhγn + 2δ . . . Σλhγn... ... . . . ...
Σλhγn Σλhγn . . . Σλhγn + 2δ
 ,
The above Hessian can be written as the sum of two matrices: H
EVindUn
h = 2δIJ +
Σλhγn1J . The first term is a positive scalar multiple of the identity matrix hence
positive definite, and the second term is a positive semidefinite matrix. Therefore,
H
EVindUn
h is positive definite and P
EVindUn is strictly convex. In addition, it is straightfor-
ward to show that the optimality conditions of the EV self-scheduling problem (Step
2 of Algorithm 2) and the optimality conditions of the potential function minimiza-
tion problem where P
EVindUn is minimized over SMLFj are identical. Hence, uniqueness
of N.E. of the EV game in the EVindUn market design follows from Theorem 2.7.3.
For EVaggsA , Hessian of the potential function P




2Σλhγn + 2δ 2Σλhγn . . . 2Σλhγn2Σλhγn 2Σλhγn + 2δ . . . 2Σλhγn... ... . . . ...
2Σλhγn 2Σλhγn . . . 2Σλhγn + 2δ
 ,
The above Hessian can be written as H
EVaggsA
h = 2δIJ + 2Σλhγn1J . Thus, H
EVaggsA
h is
positive definite by the same argument for H
EVindUn
h . Therefore, P
EVaggsA is strictly con-
vex and potential function minimization problem has a unique optimal solution. Since
the optimality conditions are identical to the N.E. equilibrium conditions obtained by
the first order optimality conditions of the LA scheduling problem (Step 2 Algorithm
5) in the EVaggsA market design, N.E. is also unique from Theorem 2.7.3.
Similar to High Charging Flexibility, we show uniqueness of the EVaggA decentral-
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ized market design, described by Algorithm 4, by showing that the LA scheduling
problem is strictly convex. In fact, the objective function in (2.79) is strictly convex
due to positivity of λP + λR, and the feasible set SMLF consists of linear inequalities.
Therefore, the optimal solution vector, qP , is unique.
Having established existence and uniqueness, the next two sections include a qual-
itative and quantitative exploration of the role of information and load aggregation
in decentralized market clearing. Section 2.8 relies on analytic closed-form expres-
sions of decentralized market equilibria that are possible under simplified EV models,
whereas Section 2.9 uses the full EV model and provides quantitative analysis based
on numerical solutions of equilibria instances.
2.8 Closed-Form Characterization of EV Schedules in De-
centralized Markets
In this section, it is assumed that EVs have unlimited charging capacity, which enables
us to derive closed-form equilibrium expressions across decentralized market designs.
However, due to the quadratic battery degradation term in the objective function,
δ(qPj )
2, fast charging is still penalized.
Since the total EV load is a small percentage of total system demand in a transmis-
sion network, transmission bus LMPs are fairly insensitive to the changes in the total
EV load. Therefore, we focus on EVs’ or LAs’ impact on distribution level DLMPs
through marginal losses. Individual EVs or LAs determine optimal EV schedules in
response to marginal loss, mn,h, dependent DLMPs.
The objective of this section is to understand the behaviour of decentralized mar-
ket equilibria and the role of information access and load aggregation through analytic
characterizations of the scheduling problems.
We first consider in Subsection 2.8.1 a two-hour version of the scheduling problems
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A , and EV
aggs
A market designs, for which we can obtain simple
closed-form equilibrium expressions. We then generalize our findings to a full 24-
hour model (in Subsection 2.8.2), and analyze asymptotic behaviour (in Subsection
2.8.3) as the number of EVs connected to each feeder increases while distribution
feeder losses adapt to increasing load. Since the charging rate capacity is assumed
unlimited5, the High Charging Flexibility input partition always holds and minimum
total charging demand, sj, satisfies (2.63) ∀j . Lemma 2.7.4 and Corollary 2.7.1.1
then imply that the equilibrium will satisfy qPj,h = q
R
j,h.
2.8.1 Closed-Form Equilibria in the Two-Hour Model
If EVs are connected for two hours, the only decision variable for EV j is energy con-




j,2 = sj. Then, in the
explicit two-hour model, the strategy set of EV j is given by S2hj = {qPj,1|qPj,1 ∈ [0, sj]}.
In the following, we assume identical EVs, since the size of individual EVs are rela-
tively similar. The market power of each load aggregator group in the multiple load
aggregator market design can still vary significantly depending on the size (number
of EVs scheduled) of each load aggregator group. Assuming J identical EVs, we can
write sj = s, ∀j ∈ J .









j,1) = ∆λ1(1 +m1)q
P
j,1 + ∆λ2(1 +m2)(s− qPj,1) + δ(qPj,1)2 + δ(s− qPj,1)2
(2.84)
5This will be the case when fast chargers, for instance with a 240 kW capacity, are widely
available.
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1 , if q
P,indUn∗













j,1) = 0. Since EVs are identical, optimality conditions with respect
to each EV are also identical. Hence, writing qPj,1 = q
P,indUn∗





1 ), m2 = γ(d
f
2 + J(s− q
P,indUn∗








1) + 2δs+ ∆λ2γJs
4δ + (∆λ2 + ∆λ1)γJ
(2.86)
The above equilibrium schedule is derived as the following:
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the following holds for the optimal solution
qP1 :
∇f indUn ,2h(qP1 )

≥ 0, if qP1 = 0
= 0, if qP1 ∈ (0, s)
≤ 0, if qP1 = s.
(2.87)






2 +J(s−qP1 )))+4δqP1 −2δs.





1 ))−∆λ2(1 + γ(d
f
2 + J(s− qP1 ))) + 4δqP1 − 2δs ≥ 0






1) + 2δs+ ∆λ2γJs
4δ + (∆λ2 + ∆λ1)γJ
(2.88)
Since the above equation holds for qP1 = 0, and denoting the right hand side by




qP∗1 , the first condition in (2.87) becomes
qP∗1 ≤ 0, if qP1 = 0.
We can show the reverse is also true. That is, if qP∗1 ≤ 0, then qP1 = 0. From primal
feasibility, we know that qP1 ≥ 0. If qP∗1 ≤ 0, then qP∗1 ≤ qP1 , which is condition (2.88).
We can show this holds for other conditions in (2.87). The equilibrium schedule is
derived similarly for other market designs.


























−j,1), which is the best response schedule of EV j to ag-









































1) + γ∆λ2(J + 1)s+ 2δs− γ(∆λ1 + ∆λ2)qP−j,1
4δ + 2γ(∆λ1 + ∆λ2)
(2.91)
As expected, the optimal consumption during hour 1 is decreasing in qP−j,h. The
best response function of EV j in addition implies that if the effective price difference
across the hours, namely |∆λ2−∆λ1|, is large enough, EVs will charge their batteries
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Figure 2·5: EV best responses; EVindA design; 2 EVs, ∆λ1 − ∆λ2 =
{0.3, 1.2}$/MWh; γ = 1.8; s1 = s2 = 12kW.
only during one of the hours, that is, the optimal solution will be on the boundary
of S2h. Similarly, when the inelastic demand difference between the hours, |df2 − d
f
1 |
is high, this will push the optimal solution to the boundaries of S2h. However, as the
line loss factor γ increases, the effect of |∆λ2(1 +γdf2)−∆λ1(1 +γd
f





−j,1) diminishes, since with increasing γ, the impact of marginal
losses, hence EV consumption on DLMPs increases.
Figure 2·5 illustrates the best response functions with two identical EVs and zero
inelastic demand, for various values of ∆λ2 − ∆λ1. Results in Figure 2·5 omits the
battery degradation term δ(qP1 )





1 , j = 1, 2. The unique equilibrium, q
P,indA ∗
1 can be recovered
from the intersection of best response functions. The best response function given
in (2.90) is piecewise linear for ∆λ1 −∆λ2 = 1.2, and the optimal solution of EV j




increases, EV j consumes energy only during the hour with the lower effective LMP.
When ∆λ1 −∆λ2 is larger, the best response of qPj,1 falls outside the [0, s] range for
all possible levels of qP−j,1. In other words, there exists a dominantly cheap hour and
EV j’s best response is not affected by the other EV’s consumption. Comparing
the EVindA equilibrium in Figure 2·5 to EVindUn and EV
agg
A for ∆λ1 −∆λ2 = 0.3, we
observe that q
P,indUn
j,1 = 4.38 kW, q
P,EVindA
j,1 = 4.90 kW, and q
P,EVaggA
j,1 = 5.17 kW.
Proposition 2.8.1 (Stability of N.E. under Information-Awareness). Con-
sider the EVindA market design. In the two-hour model, the equilibrium of the infor-
mation aware self-scheduling EVs is stable for J ≤ 3.




















(qP ) |, ∀j′ , qPj′,1 ∈ [0, sj]. (2.92)
Therefore, by (Moulin, 1984, Theorem 4), the Nash equilibrium in the EVindA market
design is stable.
Proposition 2.8.1 suggests that the unique N.E. is guaranteed to be reached when




−j,1). This refers to Step 2 of Algorithm
3. The best response iteration path with two EVs is illustrated in Figure 2·5, for
∆λ1 −∆λ2 = 0.3. For identical EVs, the solution to the system of the best response
functions in (2.91) results, when q
P,indA ∗








1) + (J + 1)∆λ2γs+ 2δs
4δ + (J + 1)γ(∆λ1 + ∆λ2)
. (2.93)
Similarly to the information-unaware self-scheduling equilibrium given in (2.86), as
|∆λ1 −∆λ2| increases, the equilibrium solution falls outside the (0, s) range.


















+ ∆λ2[1 +m2(Js− 1qPj,1)](s− qPj,1) + δ(s− qPj,1)2
The equilibrium schedule of EV j, when scheduled by the single LA in the EVaggA









































1) + 2J∆λ2γs+ 2δs− 2γ(∆λ1 + ∆λ2)qP−j,1
4δ + 2γ(∆λ1 + ∆λ2)
. (2.95)
The difference between the expression given in (2.95) and the best response in





j,h ∈ (0, s), the equilibrium of EV j in the EV
agg








1) + 2J∆λ2γs+ 2δs
4δ + 2Jγ(∆λ1 + ∆λ2)
(2.96)





















+ ∆λ2[1 +m2(Jks− 1qPk,1, J−ks− 1qP−k,1)](s− qPj,1) + δ(s− qPj,1)2 (2.97)
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where Jk is the number of EVs in LA group k, and J−k = J − Jk. Due to identical
parameters, EVs in the same LA group k will have identical equilibrium schedules, as
argued in previous market designs. However, an EV j, j ∈ Jk and EV j′, j′ ∈ Jk′ is
not guaranteed to have identical equilibrium schedules if Jk 6= Jk′ . That is, multiple
LAs with different number of EVs scheduled have different level of market power
and can extract their market power by scheduling their EVs differently. For the
following, we define qP−jk as the EVs other than EV j in the same LA group. That is,
qP−jk = {q
P
j′ |j′ ∈ Jk, j′ 6= j}.

















































1) + (J + Jk)∆λ2γs+ 2δs− γ(∆λ1 + ∆λ2)(qP−j,1 + qP−jk,1)
4δ + 2γ(∆λ1 + ∆λ2)
(2.99)
Let us define qPk,1 as the equilibrium schedule of each EV in LA group k. That is,
qPj,1 = q
P
k,1,∀j ∈ Jk. Then, at the equilibrium, q
P,aggsA ∗








1) + (J + Jk)∆λ2γs+ 2δs






k,1 + (Jk − 1)qPk,1)





k,1 for each LA k can be obtained by solving the linear system
of equations given in (2.100).
The following proposition shows the analytical differences in the equilibrium sched-
ule across single LA and self-scheduling market designs, for when the equilibrium
schedule lies within (0, s). We choose EVaggA as the representative LA market design.
Proposition 2.8.2 (Closed form expressions for differences in equilibria
across market designs). Assuming qPj,1 ∈ (0, s) and disregarding the battery degra-
dation term δ(qPj,1)
2, the magnitude of the difference in optimal EV consumption dur-
ing h = 1 with identical EVs across the decentralized market design equilibria is as
follows: ∣∣∣qP,indUn∗1 − qP,indA ∗1 ∣∣∣ = 1J(J + 1)M,∣∣∣qP,indA ∗1 − qP,aggA ∗1 ∣∣∣ = (J − 1)2J(J + 1)M,∣∣∣qP,indUn∗1 − qP,aggA ∗1 ∣∣∣ = 12JM,
where M =
∣∣∣∆λ2(1+γdf2 )−∆λ1(1+γdf1 )(∆λ1+∆λ2)γ ∣∣∣.
Proof. Proposition 2.8.2 follows from (2.86), (2.93), and (2.96).
Proposition 2.8.2 implies that the magnitude of the difference in consumption
between the LA market design (EVaggA ) and the individual self-scheduling (EV
ind
Un ,
EVindA ) equilibria, whether information aware or unaware, is greater than the mag-
nitude of the difference between the self-scheduling EVindUn and EV
ind
A equilibria for









for J ≥ 3. This result implies that there is a greater leverage of
distribution feeder information aware EVs, when they are scheduled by a load ag-
gregator. Moreover, Proposition 2.8.2 implies further that, as the number of EVs
increases, the difference in energy consumption between the self-scheduling EVindUn
and EVindA market designs decreases. This makes intuitive sense, since a single EV’s
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impact on the marginal losses, and hence the DLMPs, diminishes as the other loads
impacting feeder marginal losses become increasingly larger relative to an individual
EV’s battery charging load.
2.8.2 Closed-Form Equilibria in the Multi-Hour Model
In what follows, we provide the 24-hour simplified EV model closed-form equilibrium
relations.
Proposition 2.8.3 (Closed form equilibria expressions for simplified 24-hour
problem). Consider the EVindUn , EV
ind
A , and EV
agg
A market designs. For the multi-
hour model, assuming identical EVs with unlimited charging rate capacity, the closed-
form equilibria are given by:
q
P,EVindUn








j,h = [G(2j, h)]
+
where [x]+ = max {x, 0}, h′ = {h|qPj,h > 0}, g(h) = ∆λh(1 + γd
f
h), h(j, h) =











Proof. We provide the proofs for EVindA and EV
agg
A market designs; the proof is
similar for EVindUn . The first order optimality conditions of EV
agg
A market design
in (2.69) subject to only the minimum charging demand constraint (2.11) with J













qPj,h + s)ζ = 0. (2.102)
Since EVs are identical, ζ
j




h , ∀j. Combining (2.101)















, where h′ =
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Note that (2.103) matches (2.96) if EVs are connected only for two hours.


























− ∆λh(1 + γd
f
h)
(J + 1)γ∆λh + 2δ
.
Proposition 2.8.3 has the following interpretation: If the small battery degrada-
tion term δ is disregarded, it is clear that the EVs scheduled by the EV aggregator
consume, during the hours with the higher effective LMPs, more than they would
if they were to self schedule whether information Aware or Unaware. This is easier




j,1 is positive for
J ≥ 2 when ∆λ1 > ∆λ2.7 As shown in Proposition 2.6.1, this is because the LA is
able to estimate the marginal change in cost during an hour associated with shifting
the consumption of all EVs.
2.8.3 Asymptotic Results under Unlimited Number of EVs
We proceed with investigating the limiting behavior of EV schedules as the number of
EVs grows substantially at the distribution feeder level. Although in real distribution
networks increasing EV numbers will be compensated by increasing feeder capacity
as well as feeder numbers, and, as such, granularity will persist, we adopt a simpler
7Assuming that inelastic demand levels in a single feeder are not large enough to affect this
inequality.
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model for the purpose of looking at some interesting qualitative results. We assume
that feeder line loss factors will decrease in the long run linearly in the number of
EVs connected to the distribution network. Specifically, for J EVs, we redefine the
network loss factor as γn = γ̂n/J . With this adjustment, the closed-form EV schedule
equilibria become dependent on the number of EVs, J .8


























4δ + 2(∆λ1 + ∆λ2)γ̂
]+
, (2.106)







Decentralized market design equilibria differences persist with increasing number
of EVs and network loss factor adjustment. More specifically, EVindUn and EV
agg
A
market design equilibria are only implicitly dependent on the number of EVs through
the effective loss factor, and become completely independent as the inelastic demand
becomes relatively small. This can be seen easily for dfh = 0. This makes sense,
since the marginal hourly losses are constant in the short run w.r.t. the number
of EVs. Another intuitive result from the closed-form equilibrium relations is that
as J → ∞, the impact of inelastic demand on EV schedules approaches zero, since
the total EV load dominates inelastic demand. Figure 2·6 demonstrates clearly the
preceding discussion.
Proposition 2.8.4 (Asymptotic coincidence of individual self scheduling
information aware and unaware EVs). Given the postulated long term depen-
8Under a large number of EVs, we also assume the generation capacity of generator i is adjusted
as Qi = Qi + Js, so that wholesale prices are not significantly affected by the increased demand
from EV charging.
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Figure 2·6: Hour 1 consumption levels (qPj,1) and cost difference per
EV between EVindA and EV
agg
A designs, for fixed effective LMPs (∆λh),
w.r.t. large number of EVs. Loss factor γ = γ̂
J
, where γ̂ = 15; dh =
0,∀h; ∆λ1 −∆λ2 = 2.5$/MWh; s = 12kW. This figure was originally
published in (Yanikara et al., 2019).
dence of the feeder loss factor γ on the number of EVs, γ̂
J
, information-unaware and
aware self-scheduling EVindUn and EV
ind
A equilibria become asymptotically identical as
J →∞.
Proof. We illustrate this on the two-hour equilibria given by (2.104) and (2.105). As
J →∞, J+1
J






Proposition 2.8.4 is consistent with and reiterates a conclusion that can be drawn
from Proposition 2.8.2, which shows the analytical differences in equilibrium under
finite number of EVs connected to a feeder. Proposition 2.8.2 implies that the dif-
ference between the equilibrium of information-aware/unaware EVindA and EV
ind
Un
market designs approach zero as the number of EVs, J , increases. In Proposition
2.8.4, we show that these two market designs become identical for a large number of
EVs even when the network loss factor adjusts to accommodate an unlimited increase
in the number of connected EVs.
Proposition 2.8.5 (Equilibrium of individually scheduled information aware
and unaware EVs relative to information aware Load Aggregator scheduled
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EVs under large number of EVs). Given the postulated long term dependence of
the feeder loss factor on the number of EVs, γ̂
J
, and disregarding battery degradation
term δ, the difference in consumption level between the two-hour self-scheduling and
the load aggregator EVaggA market designs as J →∞ is given by:∣∣∣qP,EVaggAj,1 − qP,EVindAj,1 ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣qP,EVaggAj,1 − qP,indUnj,1 ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ ∆λ1 −∆λ22(∆λ1 + ∆λ2)γ̂
∣∣∣∣ . (2.107)
Proof. The results are obtained directly from (2.104), (2.105), and (2.106).
Figure 2·6 shows the optimal consumption level in the information-aware EVindA
and EVaggA market designs for the two-hour model for a wide range of EV numbers.




In this section, we numerically solve the market designs and provide results on the
extent of differences among market design equilibria, first for the simplified two-hour
models in the absence of maximum charging rate constraint, then for the general
multi-hour model focusing on the impact of limited charging rate.
2.9.1 Two-Hour Closed Form Results
This section includes numerical results obtained by the closed form solutions of the
simplified two-hour market designs introduced in Subsection 2.8.1. Assuming identical
EVs, we compare the equilibrium schedules of EVs (i.e., optimal consumption levels
and total charging cost) among decentralized and centralized market designs. In the
following results, the optimal EV schedules obtained by the centralized market design
with a single operator, TDA, are also included, with the assumption that energy and
reserve transmission LMPs are insensitive to EV demand. This is ensured by assigning
appropriate generation and reserve provision capacities to the centralized generators.
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Figure 2·7 shows the optimal consumption level of a single EV during h = 1,






A , and EV
aggs
A market designs as
well as the centralized TDA design. Each EV is assumed to have a total charging
demand of 14 kwh. Equilibrium schedules are plotted against the number of EVs
that are connected to the distribution feeder, for four different levels of effective price
difference between the two hours, ∆λ1 − ∆λ2. The inelastic demand during both
hours is equal to 0.6 MW. Therefore, each J value translates into a different level of
EV penetration with respect to inelastic demand. For the default value of the loss
factor, γ, maximum marginal losses reach around 28%; marginal losses are assumed
to be high with the purpose of capturing the overall impact of other marginal cost
components9 on the DLMPs.
For a given small number of EVs (J), as the effective price difference across the
hours (∆λ1−∆λ2) increases, the optimal consumption becomes a boundary solution,
and EVs charge only during h = 2. For large enough number of EVs, however, the
effective DLMP difference across the hours (∆λ1(1 + m1) − ∆λ2(1 + m2)) becomes
small enough for EVs to reduce their cost by splitting their charging across both hours.
The number of EVs beyond which EV consumption occurs during both hours is the
smallest in the single LA market design (EVaggsA ). As discussed earlier and shown
analytically in Proposition 2.6.1, the LA minimizes the total cost of charging with
respect to all EVs, therefore has more advantage in reducing the total charging cost.
For the multiple LA design EVaggsA , it is assumed that there are two aggregators
10,
i.e., K = 2. The maximum difference in the optimal consumption levels observed
among the decentralized designs increases as ∆λ1 −∆λ2 increases.
As expected, and demonstrated analytically in Proposition 2.8.2, the difference in
the consumption level during h = 1 is higher between the EVindA and EV
agg
A market
9An example to this is transformer loss of life.
10When J is odd, we assume that Jk+1 = Jk + 1, k = 1, 2.
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Figure 2·7: Hour 1 consumption level (qPj,1) of a single EV, comparing
centralized TDA design and decentralized designs, w.r.t. number of






































































































Figure 2·8: Comparison of total EV consumption and marginal losses
obtained by the centralized TDA design and decentralized designs,
w.r.t. number of EVs, J . Loss factor γ = 0.22; dfh = 0.6MW,h = 1, 2;
s = 14 kW; ∆λ1 −∆λ2 = 2.
designs than between the self-scheduling EVindUn and EV
ind
A designs.
Another result that can be concluded from Proposition 2.8.2 is that in the single
LA design, the LA schedules EVs in a way that they charge more during the high LMP
hour compared to other self-scheduling market designs. This is in fact illustrated in
Figure 2·8, which shows the total EV consumption levels in each decentralized design
across the two hours, for ∆λ1−∆λ2 = 2 and two levels of J . Consumption difference
is also an important indicator of the efficiency of the decentralized market designs,
since marginal losses are a function of total EV consumption. For high EV penetration
(i.e., J = 40), Table 2.2 shows the percentage differences in total EV consumption
and marginal losses of decentralized market designs compared to the benchmark social
welfare maximizing market design (TDA), for each hour.
Results in Table 2.2 show that for higher EV penetration, the difference in total
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Table 2.2: Total EV consumption and marginal losses in decentralized
market designs minus the centralized market design (TDA). Percentage
differences are shown in parentheses.
∆ Total EV consumption ∆ Marginal Loss (%)
MW (%)
Hour 1* Hour 2 Hour 1 Hour 2
EVUnind 0.079 (n/a) -0.079 (-14) 0.017 (13) -0.017 (-7)
EVAind 0.084 (n/a) -0.084 (-15) 0.018 (14) -0.018 (-7)
EVAaggs,K = 4 0.117 (n/a) -0.117 (-21) 0.026 (20) -0.026 (-10)
EVAaggs,K = 2 0.143 (n/a) -0.143 (-25) 0.031 (24) -0.031 (-12)
EVAagg 0.174 (n/a) -0.174 (-31) 0.038 (29) -0.038 (-15)
*Total EV consumption during Hour 1
in the centralized market design is equal to zero.
consumption between decentralized single load aggregator market design (EVaggA ) and
centralized design reaches 31% during Hour 2. During Hour 1, marginal losses are
29% higher in the decentralized EVaggA market design than the centralized design, and
15% lower during Hour 2, which in return impacts the DLMPs and total payment
of conventional demand customers. The marginal loss differences across the hours
between EVaggA and centralized market design translate into 3.4% difference in the
effective DLMP (∆λn,h) during Hour 1 and 3.1% difference during Hour 2.
Figure 2·9 shows the total EV cost obtained by the second best centralized TDUn
design, minus the total EV cost obtained by each decentralized design with respect
to number of EVs, which can be viewed as the cost reduction in decentralized market
designs compared to the second best social welfare. For the multiple LA design, we
compare results for different number of LAs, for K = 2 and K = 4. For a fixed J , the
number scheduled by each LA is lower for higher number of LAs (K). Results show
that expectedly, information aware single LA design achieves the lowest total EV cost
compared to the centralized design. At the highest, the cost difference between the
single LA design EVaggA and the centralized design reaches 2%. It is important to
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Figure 2·9: Total cost of EVs obtained by the centralized TDUn
design minus decentralized designs (∆ Total EV Cost), w.r.t. number
of EVs, J . Loss factor γ = 0.22; dfh = 0.6 MW, h = 1, 2; s = 14kW
note that these differences are incurred per one feeder, per one two-hour charging
session. Therefore, the cost differences can become substantial if EVs are connected
to more number of feeders.
Figure 2·9 also shows that as the size (number of EVs scheduled, Jk) of each LA
is smaller, LAs cannot achieve as much of a total cost reduction as the single LA
market design.
Figure 2·10 shows how the single feeder total cost difference results shown in Figure
2·9 propagate to multiple feeders. For a fixed total number of EVs in a distribution
80
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Figure 2·10: Total cost obtained by the second best centralized mar-
ket design (TDUn) minus decentralized designs (∆ Total Cost) for a
total 1000 EVs, wrt number of EVs in a feeder.
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grid equal to 1000, we redefine J as the number of EVs in a feeder. Therefore, the
number of feeders is given by 1000
J
. Results show that when ∆λ1 −∆λ2 = 3.5, total
cost difference between decentralized single load aggregator design and the centralized
design reaches 2%.
2.9.2 Multi-Hour Results with Charging Rate Capacity
This subsection includes multi-hour results in the presence of charging rate capacity
and differences in market design equilibria are compared across High and Moder-
ate/Low charging flexibility cases. EVs are assumed to be plugged in for a total of
six hours. We assume only flexible EV demand is connected to the feeder, focus-
ing on the impact of limited charging rate on the differences in decentralized market
design equilibria. EVs are identical, and each EV has a minimum total charging
demand of 20 kw. We compare two levels of charging rate; 24 kw and 12 kw, where
the first represents High Charging flexibility, and the second charging rate level rep-
resents Moderate flexibility. Figure 2·11 shows the total EV cost obtained by each
decentralized market design under High and Moderate flexibility, compared to the
equilibrium of EVindUn , which represents the second best social welfare equilibrium.
For each market design and charging flexibility level, we solve the single commodity
formulations represented in Section 2.7. Results show that under Moderate Flexibil-
ity, differences in market equilibria significantly diminish, since EVs no longer have
sufficient degrees of freedom to move around consumption across the hours and re-
duce their costs. Similar to the two-hour results provided in the previous Subsection
2.9.1, the single LA design achieves the lowest charging cost, followed by the multiple
LA designs, depending on the size of each LA.
We summarize the key findings with regards to the differences in market equilibria
as follows:
• The information aware single LA design, EVaggA , achieves the lowest total EV
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Figure 2·11: Total EV cost obtained by the decentralized, information
unaware EVindUn design minus information aware decentralized designs,
w.r.t. number of EVs, J , in the multi-hour model, under High and
Moderate charging flexibility. s = 20 kw; γ = 0.3.
charging cost by simultaneously scheduling all EVs connected to a feeder.
• In the multiple LA design EVaggsA , for a given total number of EVs in a feeder,
the total charging cost reduction compared to the benchmark social welfare
maximizing design, TDA, is reversely proportionate to the size of each LA.
That is, the influence of LAs on the equilibrium increases if LAs schedule larger
number of EVs.
• Differences in market equilibria diminish under Moderate/Low Charging flexi-
bility compared to High Charging flexibility, since EVs or LAs have no degrees
of freedom to flexibly allocate their consumption across the hours and influence
prices (DLMPs). This is illustrated in Figure 2·11.
• Differences in market equilibria increase with increasing differences in effective
prices across the hours, given that price differences are not high enough to
incentivize EVs to charge only during dominantly cheap hours. However, as
the differences in prices across the hours increase, larger number of EVs are
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required to observe market equilibria differences. This is illustrated in Figure
2·7.
• Fewer EVs are required to observe market equilibria differences for higher loss
factor γ values, this is because EVs’ influence on marginal losses increases with
γ.
• Under High Charging flexibility, differences in market equilibria increase with
charging demand, s.
2.10 Part I Conclusion and Summary
In the first part of the thesis, we have formulated and analyzed in detail centralized
and decentralized energy and regulation reserve market designs including storage-like
EVs as market participants. We consider various decentralized market designs that
differ in (i) EVs’ access to marginal losses information that allow them to express Dis-
tribution Locational Marginal Prices (DLMPs) as a function of substation Locational
Marginal Prices (LMPs), which we assume are fairly insensitive to EV consumption
levels, and (ii) EVs’ participation in the market individually or through a Load Aggre-
gator (LA). Due to hierarchical structure of decentralized market designs, existence
and uniqueness of market equilibrium must be analyzed. In this part of the thesis,
we do so by applying game theory techniques and analyzing the market equilibrium
in the context of Nash Equilibrium. Our analytical findings, where we utilize the
potential function approach, show that the equilibrium of EV schedules in the decen-
tralized market designs is indeed unique. First order optimality condition analysis
also indicates differences among centralized and decentralized market designs, which
we numerically investigate as well. For a two-hour market model, we are able to
construct closed-form expressions of the equilibrium of EV schedules in each market
design. The closed-form expressions give analytical insight to the differences in the
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market clearing equilibria. Analytical insight and results obtained from closed-form
expressions are verified through numerical results. Results also show that when EVs
have access to functional form of marginal losses which is a linear function of total
EV consumption, EVs are able to reduce their net charging costs compared to the




Part II: Optimal Deployment of




As discussed in Part I of this thesis, the proliferation of intermittent renewable gen-
eration brings various operational challenges to the electricity Transmission & Dis-
tribution (T&D) grid, such as increased variability and abrupt changes in the net
load, as well as difficult to maintain instantaneous demand and supply balance. Con-
sequently, there is an increasingly important need for grid flexibility at various time
scales (Holttinen et al., 2013), (Litvinov et al., 2019). Ancillary energy services such
as regulation reserves aim to ensure real-time energy balance through utilizing fast-
responding resources. Battery like loads connected to the distribution network, such
as EVs, and their synergies with renewable generation carry significant potential in
providing such flexibility from which the grid can benefit. In addition to schedul-
ing their hourly consumption, EVs can at the same schedule their regulation reserve
offer. However, it is crucial for EVs to capture actual costs of providing regulation
reserve service while bidding into the day ahead market and deciding their hourly
consumption/regulation offer quantities in order to avoid performance costs.
In this part of the thesis, we try to capture such hourly expected costs, based on
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a salient battery charging model and EV dynamics constraints at the hourly time
scale, given the optimal seconds time scale deployment of regulation reserves. Our
objective is to derive a regulation signal tracking cost component in the objective
function of the EV scheduling problem that will drive the EV decision on energy con-
sumption and reserve offer each hour. A realistic battery model is crucial in order to
take into account the true limits of a battery when providing regulation reserves. To
this end, we adopt a realistic battery charging model inspired by the well-known Ki-
netic Battery Model (KiBaM) introduced in (Manwell and McGowan, 1993), thereby
we are able to capture the realistic dynamics of battery charging. Adopting such a
charging model, we estimate hourly regulation signal tracking cost through a novel
methodology consisting of successively solving multiple average cost Markovian Deci-
sion Process (MDP) problems through linear programming in a backward-recursion
fashion. The LP-based MDP solutions in a backward recursion synthesize multi-
step lookahead Dynamic Programming (DP) problems. Our proposed methodology
provides a tractable formulation as opposed to the stochastic, finite horizon DP al-
gorithm, which suffers from curse of dimensionality for the signal tracking problem.
In the remainder of this chapter, we shortly refer to the proposed methodology as
average cost MDP methodology.
This chapter is organized as follows: In subsection 3.1.2 we provide a background
of regulation reserve provision, and follow up in subsection 3.1.3 with related work
and list our contributions. Section 3.2 includes a detailed representation of the kinetic
battery model. Section 3.3 shows the hourly cost associated with providing reserves
within the context of EV day ahead market decisions. In Section 3.4, we introduce
the formulation of the regulation reserve tracking problem in the context of Dynamic
Programming. Stochastic regulation signal dynamics, and state space discretization
are introduced in Subsection 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, respectively. Subsection 3.4.4 introduces
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our proposed average cost MDP methodology, and Section 3.5 provides numerical
results. In Section 3.6, we analyze the EV energy and reserve scheduling problem
with the inclusion of the tracking cost. In Section 3.7, we summarize our findings.
3.1.2 Background
Participants of the regulation reserve market are required to modify their real-time
consumption according to the signals broadcast by the grid operator. More specif-
ically, an EV that bids to consume qP amount of energy and provide qR amount
of reserves during a specific hour agrees to vary its real-time consumption to match
qP +ytqR, where yt is the stochastic regulation signal broadcast every 2 seconds. The
range of the regulation signal is [−1, 1], hence an EV’s real-time consumption varies
within the range [qP − qR, qP + qR]. Since the regulation signal designed for battery
like participants is energy neutral, that is, the hourly average is equal to zero, an
EV that provides qR amount of reserves on average consumes qP during an hour.
A sample trajectory of the regulation signal obtained from PJM regulation data is
shown in Figure 3·1.
Regulation reserve market is based on performance, that is, a participant might
lose eligibility to provide reserves if a certain level of signal tracking performance is not
maintained (PJM, 2018). An EV might incur tracking costs due to limited battery
and charging rate capacity if reserve provision offer is high. Thus, it is essential
for an EV as a market participant to incorporate the hourly tracking cost in the
optimal reserve offer decision in the day ahead market 1. To this end, we employ
a novel, backward-recursion based average cost MDP methodology to estimate the
hourly tracking costs associated with fixed hourly energy consumption and reserve
offer quantities.
1EVs might incur other costs due to signal tracking such as battery degradation due to variable
charging. In this thesis, we focus on estimating the tracking cost.
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Figure 3·1: Sample trajectory of the dynamic regulation signal over
an hour with ∆t = 2 seconds. Obtained from PJM Reg-D data (PJM,
2019).
3.1.3 Part II Literature Review and Contributions
Stochastic dynamic programming has been adopted by several works for the regu-
lation reserve deployment problem ((Donadee and Ilić, 2014), (Bilgin et al., 2015)).
Authors in (Donadee and Ilić, 2014) consider the stochasticity in the hour average
of the regulation signal and the hourly energy prices. However, real-time stochastic
dynamics of the regulation signal is not considered, and the EV battery is assumed
to behave ideally. The tracking performance is modeled as a hard constraint, that is,
the total reserve offer and energy consumption is less than the charging rate capacity.
However, this is a highly conservative approach and the trade-offs between the reserve
offer revenue and signal tracking performance is not captured. Average cost infinite
horizon dynamic programming is adopted by (Bilgin et al., 2013) for smart building
regulation reserve provision management. Similarly to our work, signal tracking error
is minimized, where authors discover a sigmoid relationship between the optimal con-
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trol and the tracking error. In (Bilgin et al., 2015), an approximate policy iteration
method is proposed to optimize the parameters of the policy function.
In this part of the thesis, we propose a backward-recursion based methodology
consisting of average cost MDP formulations combined with linear programming so-
lution approach to calculate the average hourly signal tracking cost of EVs for given
energy consumption and reserve offer quantities. We formulate and successively solve
using a linear programming approach, multiple 5 minute average cost MDPs, starting
from the end of the hour of interest. The average cost of each MDP provides the
cost-to-go approximation to be used in the next MDP, thereby, the MDP solutions
synthesize the finite, multi-step lookahead DP problems.
Our contributions can be listed as the following:
• We employ a more realistic battery model inspired by Kinetic Battery Model
(KiBaM) and normalize it in terms of energy consumption to use in the day
ahead EV scheduling problem, where EVs decide their optimal hourly energy
and regulation reserve schedules.
• We introduce a novel, tractable, and successive LP solution based, average
cost MDP methodology to determine the time variant optimal deployment of
regulation reserves in the seconds time scale,
• We estimate the average hourly tracking cost associated with providing regula-
tion reserves, synthesized by the successive LP-based average cost MDP solu-
tions.
In the following section, kinetic battery model is introduced.
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Figure 3·2: Illustration of the Kinetic Battery Model
3.2 Battery Model
The battery dynamics are based on Kinetic Battery Model (KiBaM), adapted to
charging only case and normalized in terms of energy consumption. In this charging
model, total battery state of charge (SoC) is assumed to be allocated into two charge
buckets, x1 and x2, where x2 is directly connected to the external power source.
Power directly flows into the second bucket and from there it is transferred to the
first bucket at a rate proportional to the charge difference with respect to bucket x2
and a constant transfer rate κ. Total SoC is modeled as the sum of energy stored in
two buckets. The kinetic battery model is illustrated in Figure 3·2.
The following time differential equations represent the battery charging dynamics
with h < t < h+ 1 being the continuous time evolution during hour h:
ẋt2 = q















where qP and qR are the given hourly energy and reserve quantities, and ut is the
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control representing the deployment level of regulation reserves. In the case of perfect
signal tracking, ut = yt. The differential equations (3.1) and (3.2) provide the max-
imum constant charging rate that is sustainable during hour h as a function of the
level of the first and second bucket at the beginning of hour h. This model captures
the underlying idea that the maximum constant hourly charging rate is constrained
by the bucket specific SoC at the beginning of the hour. Since ∆t = 2 seconds, we
















Given the battery dynamics in (3.4) and (3.5), we can construct the maximum










where x2 is the capacity of the second bucket.
We next introduce the EV self-scheduling problem and show the signal tracking
cost as a component of EV’s objective function.
3.3 EV Self-scheduling Problem in the Energy and Reserves
Co-clearing Day Ahead Market Using Kinetic Battery
Model
As energy and reserves market participants, EVs minimize their own total cost upon
receiving clearing price signals at their feeder, and allocate their charging capacity
to energy and reserve quantities in an optimal manner. The maximum sustainable
constant charging rate during an hour is obtained by the solution to the differential






















where fh = x
h+qP,h
2
and xh is the total SoC during hour h.
Using (3.7) and (3.8), we can write the maximum hourly charging rate as:
qP,h =
2κ
2κ− e−2κ + 1
(
2x2 − xh + e−2κ(xh1 − xh2)
)
(3.9)
The following constraints are needed to be satisfied every hour:







where P out represents the rated power of the charger outlet. If constraints (3.10) and
(3.11) are replaced by the inequality qP +qR ≤ qP,h, zero tracking error is guaranteed.
An EV solves the following self-scheduling problem and determines its optimal





h − λRn,hqRh + δ(qPh )2 + J(xh|qPh , qRh ) (3.12)
subject to (3.7), (3.8), (3.10), (3.11).
The first two components of the objective function represent the energy cost and
reserve revenue, third component is the battery related physical cost function (e.g.,
battery degradation), and the final component is the hourly regulation signal tracking
cost. It is the last component that we focus on in this part of the thesis.
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3.4 Optimal Regulation Reserve Tracking Error Control: A
Cascaded MDP Formulation
The objective is to estimate the minimum hourly signal tracking cost by optimal real-
time deployment of EV reserve offer that is promised in the hourly time scale. The
average signal tracking cost obtained as a function of EV energy consumption, reserve
offer, and battery state of charge, will drive optimal hourly energy consumption and
reserve offer decisions/schedules of EVs as shown in EV scheduling problem in (3.12).
Employing a realistic battery charging model presented in Subsection 3.2, we esti-
mate the average hourly signal tracking cost through successive LP-based Markovian
Decision Process (MDP) solutions, synthesizing five minute lookahead problems.
Optimal deployment decision needs to be made every 2 seconds in response to the
regulation signal and the battery maximal charging rate derived by (3.6), as specified
for the current state of charge by the realistic battery model. The following subsec-
tions introduce the stochastic signal tracking problem, including formal definitions of
the state and control space. Subsection 3.4.2 presents the stochastic dynamics of the
regulation signal. The LP-based formulation requires state and control discretization,
hence, we include the details regarding discretization in Subsection 3.4.3. Detailed
methodology for estimating the average tracking cost through successive LP based
MDP solutions is presented in Subsection 3.4.4.
3.4.1 Regulation Signal Tracking Problem
The state at time t includes battery state of charge represented by the two bucket
model, value of the regulation signal, and its direction. State at time t is denoted by
st and is given by;
st = {xt2, xt1, yt, dt}
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where t = 0, . . . , t, . . . , T and T represents 1 hour. The control at time t, ut, represents
the deployment rate of reserves, qR, and needs to be determined every 2 seconds due
to the broadcast frequency of the dynamic regulation signal y. That is, battery
charging level at t is equal to qP + utqR. We also note that the state and control
space boundaries are well defined, such that x2 ∈ [0, x̄2], x1 ∈ [0, x̄1], y ∈ [−1, 1],
d ∈ {−1, 1}, and u ∈ [−qP
qR
, 1] 2.
The cost per period is a function of the regulation signal yt, control ut, and the
fixed hourly reserve offer, qR, and is given by:





The above cost per period function represents the quadratic difference between the
actual reserve deployment, utqR, and the requested deployment, ytqR. A quadratic
penalty ensures avoiding large deviations from the promised reserve deployment levels.
The stochastic finite horizon Dynamic Programming (DP) algorithm associated
with the signal tracking problem described above can be written as the following
(Bertsekas, 2005):
JT (sT ) = 0,




{gt(yt, ut|qR) + J t+1(xt+11 (xt1, xt2), xt+12 (xt1, xt2, ut), yt + ∆yt, dt+1)}
where µ∗t(st) represents the optimal policies and µ∗t(st) = u∗t.
The above DP algorithm suffers from curse of dimensionality and is computa-
tionally intractable. As an illustrative example, the state space cardinality reaches
432,000 with (i) a time interval of ∆t=20 sec which allows us to write ∆y = 1
7
, hence
|y| = |u| = 15, and (ii) ∆x1 = ∆x2 = 0.1, which is certainly a coarse discretization.
As such, we turn our attention to finite horizon multi-step lookahead formulation
2Optimal deployment is bounded above by 1 since there is no incentive to charge higher than
qP + qR.
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Figure 3·3: Illustration of the expansion of the set of possible x2 states
at t, with xt02 = 6 kwh.
as a value space approximation technique (Bertsekas, 2019), where the DP algorithm
is solved for a shorter horizon equal to the lookahead length l, from t to t+l, replacing
the cost-to-go functions at the final step, J t+l(st+l), with an approximation, Ĵ t+l(st+l).
In addition, the hourly regulation signal consists of approximately 5-minute long
cycles (Figure 3·1), meaning that one can capture many sample trajectories of the
signal even with a horizon shorter than one hour. However, even with a coarser time
update and state space approximations, finite horizon 5-minute lookahead problem
suffers from curse of dimensionality since state space at each period expands as the
lookahead horizon grows (Bertsekas, 2005), as illustrated in Figure 3·3.
Consequently, we propose a variation of the finite horizon lookahead problem,
by modeling infinite cycles of the finite horizon 5-minute Markov chain of the state
evolution (Figure 3·6), and modeling time t as a part of the state space. This allows
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us to obtain optimal deployment as a function of time t within the hour. We also
obtain cost-to-go approximations for each xt02 where t0 = {0, 0 + l, 0 + 2l, . . . , T − l}.
Each finite horizon problem is modeled as an MDP. We employ an LP-based solution
approach and solve the 5-minute average cost MDPs numerically with a backwards
recursion for fixed hourly energy consumption and reserve offer quantities, qP and
qR, as well as initial battery state at the beginning of the hour, x02. This requires
the discretization of the state and control spaces defined above (Bertsekas, 2011). At
the last step of successive solution of average cost MDPs, the average hourly signal
tracking cost associated with qP , qR, and x02 is obtained.
Before we introduce our proposed methodology in detail in subsection 3.4.4 and
the LP-based solution approach, we first introduce the regulation signal dynamics
as well as the discretization of the battery state dynamics. We introduce a series
of approximations to the battery dynamics in subsection 3.4.3 and reduce the two-
variable representation of the battery state to a single-variable representation only as
a function of x2.
3.4.2 Regulation Signal Dynamics
The regulation signal stochastically evolves based on the most recent value of the
signal yt and its direction, dt. The direction indicates whether the signal has increased
or decreased from time t− 1 to t. Signal direction dynamics is defined as follows:
dt =

1, if ∆yt > 0
−1, if ∆yt < 0
dt−1, if ∆yt = 0
(3.14)
where ∆yt = yt − yt−1. The probability of the regulation signal going in the positive
direction is higher if dt = 1 and vice versa for the probability of going in the neg-
ative direction. That is, P (∆yt > 0|dt = 1) > P (∆yt > 0|dt = −1). In addition,
P (∆yt > 0) decreases as yt approaches 1, and vice versa. The state frequencies, P (y),
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Figure 3·4: Generated 1-hour sample trajectories of the regulation
signal y.
and the conditional transition probabilities, P (∆y|d), are estimated based on histor-
ical dynamic regulation signal data (PJM, 2019). In Figure 3·4, we show sample y
trajectories generated with the calibrated probabilities and the aforementioned signal
value and direction dynamics.
3.4.3 Discretization of the Battery State and Probabilistic Transition
The battery state dynamics given in (3.4) and (3.5) are approximated as the following:
The imbalance between the two buckets, defined as x2−x1 is assumed to be constant
during the hour. This is a reasonable assumption since the rate of change in the
imbalance monotonically decreases during an hour with constant charging, where the
rate of change is dependent on the average hourly constant charging rate qP . Figure
3·5 shows the evolution of xt2, xt1, and xt2 − xt1 during an hour for a given constant
charging rate of 9 kw, where both x2 and x1 are equal to 6 kw in the beginning of
the hour. The value of the transfer rate κ is determined through simulation of the
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battery dynamics and a value that resembles non-ideal battery charging behaviour
(e.g., significantly reduced allowable charging rate after the battery reaches 90% SoC)
is selected.
We define the constant average imbalance as β in a given hour, and represent the




P + utqR)∆t− β (3.15)
where β is calculated as a function of xh2 and x
h
1 where h is the beginning of the hour
and h < t < h + 1. xt1 evolves according to the constant imbalance β, but doesn’t
need to be explicitly modeled since the maximum reserve deployment rate is now a
function in the form u(x2, β).
Consequently, the state space at time t, st, reduces to st = {xt2, yt, dt}. The LP
then need to be solved for given levels of qP , qR and β, and the initial battery level
at the beginning of the hour, x02.
We discretize the battery state x2 as the following: Choosing ∆x2 equal to
the smallest (other than zero) possible increment of x2, in other words equal to(
qp − (m− 1)∆uqR
)
∆t wherem = q
p
∆uqR
, leads to a large number of possible x2 states.
Thus, we discretize x2 with coarser increments where ∆x2 > (q
P − (m− 1)∆uqR)∆t.
In that case, different levels of reserve deployment u correspond to the same level of
x2 increment ∆x2. Hence, we employ a probabilistic state transition for x2 and define
the following:
η + ε =
(qP + utqR)∆t− β
∆x2
(3.16)
where η is the integer term of the above division and ε is the decimal term. Then, x2
evolves probabilistically according to:
xt+12 =
{
xt2 + η∆x2 with prob. 1− ε
xt2 + (η + 1)∆x2 with prob. ε
(3.17)
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Figure 3·5: The evolution of x2, x1, and the imbalance during an hour
with an average charging rate of 9 kw. Initial values of x2 and x1 is 6
kwh.
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Therefore, when ε is small, the increment of x2 is closer to η∆x2.
3.4.4 Successive LP-based Finite Period Look-Ahead Synthesizing MDP
Solutions
Finite horizon 5-minute lookahead DP algorithm for the regulation signal tracking
problem described in Subsection 3.4.1 is intractable given the dimensionality of the
state space. Thus, we propose a backward-recursion based methodology that syn-
thesizes the finite look-ahead DP problems. We model a variation of the 5-minute
lookahead (Markovian Decision Process) MDP, by modeling a cyclic 5-minute Markov
chain where the vector of reachable states at t0 + l (l = 5 minutes) including x2
t0+l,
yt0+l, and dt0+l transition back to the initial battery and signal state at t0, namely
xt02 and y
t0 , and to the vector of all dt0 states with equal probability. More specif-
ically, time is modeled as an auxiliary state, and updated deterministically from t
to t + 1 when a control is applied. Therefore, the state space vector is given by
st = {x2t,yt,dt, t}. As such, we are able to capture the dependency of the optimal
control ut, on time t within the hour.
At time t0 + l, state vector s
t0+l transitions to the initial state vector st0 (Figure
3·6), where l = 5 minutes and st0 = {xt02 , yt0 ,dt0 , t0}. It is assumed that the two
possible signal direction values, -1 and 1, are equally likely at the beginning. Transi-
tion to the initial state vector represents modeling infinite replications of the Markov
chain associated with the finite horizon 5-minute lookahead DP prpblems. The ter-
minal cost is incurred when the initial value of the time state, denoted by t0, reaches
t0 + l. Since there is no discounting factor in the case of tracking cost nor a terminal,
cost-free absorbing state in the underlying Markov Chain, we focus on average cost
MDP.
We proceed with showing two important properties of the underlying Markov
Chain. The Markov Chain shown in Figure 3·6 is a unichain where all states com-
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Figure 3·6: The underlying 5-minute Markov Chain of the proposed
MDP. The system transitions to the initial battery state when t reaches
t0 + l.
municate, thus, steady state probabilities are guaranteed to exist. In addition, the
following holds:
Proposition 3.4.1 (Existence of optimal stationary policy). Given the finite
state and control spaces, as well as bounded period cost, an optimal stationary policy
exists for the proposed 5-minute average cost MDP with the underlying Markov Chain
shown in Figure 3·6.
Proof. The discretized state and control spaces are all well defined and finite as dis-
cussed in subsection 3.4.1. The period cost, g(ut, yt) is bounded below by zero and
bounded above by (1 − qP
qR
)2. Therefore, by Theorem 8.1.2 in (Puterman, 2014), an
optimal stationary policy exists.
The optimal policy obtained from each 5-minute average cost MDP is a function
of the time state, t. However, a stationary policy means whenever the state is at a
certain x2, y, d, and t level, the optimal policy is the same.
Next, we show that the average cost Bellman equation (Bertsekas, 2011) holds:
Proposition 3.4.2 (Average cost Bellman equation). 1. In the Markov Chain
associated with the proposed 5-minute average cost MDP shown in Figure 3·6,
there exists a stationary policy such that for every two states i and j, the prob-
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ability that j will be visited from i in a finite number of steps is positive, where






2. Given Item 1, the following average cost Bellman equation holds for the proposed
5-minute MDP with the underlying Markov Chain shown in 3·6:










Proof. We prove Item 1 by showing that there is at least two states that can be
reached at each t = {t0, t0 + 1, . . . , t0 + l} layer of the Markov Chain shown in Figure
3·6 for a fixed, arbitrary stationary policy vector µ(st) = µ(x2t,yt,dt, t), and that
the Markov Chain associated with that policy vector is a unichain.
Note that x2 is a function of the control whereas the stochastic dynamics of y and d
states are independent of the control. Time state t evolves deterministically whenever
a control is applied, from t to t+ 1. Assume that at the t0 layer, a stationary policy
vector µ(st0) is selected for each state st0 ∈ st0 , where st0 = {xt02 , yt0 ,dt0 , t0},dt0 =
{−1, 1}. At the t0 + 1 layer of the Markov Chain, there is at least two xt0+12 levels,
two yt0+1 levels, and all the possible d levels that can be reached from st0 , applying
policy vector µ(st0). Let µ1 = µ(x
t0
2 , 1, 1, t0) and µ2 = µ(x
t0














where ηµ1 and ηµ2 are obtained from equation (3.16) given µ1 and µ2. Then, s
t0+1 =
{x2t0+1,yt0+1,dt0+1, t0 + 1}. Similarly, at each t layer, there is at least two xt2 states
that can be reached using a fixed stationary policy vector µ(st−1). At t0 + l, s
t0+l
transitions to st0 regardless of the policy vector µ(st0+l). Thus, the Markov Chain
associated with the arbitrary stationary policy vector µ(st),∀t = {t0, t0 +1, . . . , t0 + l}
is a unichain. Besides, the policy vector at each t layer, µ(st), can be chosen in a way
that any two states, i and j are visited. Due to the unichain property, it is guaranteed
that j is visited from i in finite number of steps.
Item 2 follows from Proposition 2.6 in (Bertsekas, 2011).
Since we have shown that the average cost Bellman equation in (3.18) holds, a
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well-known linear programming solution approach can be adopted (Bertsekas, 2011)
to solve each 5-minute average cost MDP. Through successive LP-based solutions
starting from the last 5 minutes of the hour, we obtain cost-to-go approximations at
each t0 = {T− l, T−2l, .., t0, ..., l, 0} where T = 1 hour, with the initial condition that
the terminal cost incurred by all states at t = T , gT , is equal to zero. At the last step
of successive LP-based MDP evaluations (i.e., at t0 = 0), the average tracking cost,
J(x02|qP , qR), is obtained with respect to each discrete level of initial battery state x02
at the beginning of the hour.






cost-to-go approximation associated with battery state x2 at time t0 + l. Denoted by
Ĵ(xt0+l2 ), the cost-to-go approximation is equal to the average tracking cost incurred
from t0 + l until the end of the hour starting from state x
t0+l
2 , multiplied by the
lookahead length l = 5 minutes. More formally, Ĵ(xt0+l2 ) is written as;
Ĵ(xt0+l2 ) = J(x
t0+l
2 )l. (3.20)
J is the average cost obtained by solving the LP shown below, that consists of
minimizing (3.21) subject to (3.22) and (3.23). The LP is successively solved for each
t0 within the hour, where ∆t0=5 minutes and t0 = {0, 5, ..., t0, ..., 50, 55}.
Recall that at t0, x2
t0 is a single value representing the battery state at time t0.
Given a battery level x2 at the beginning of the hour, (i.e., at t0 = 0), as well as the
energy and reserve quantities qP and qR, the set of reachable battery states at time
t, X t2, can be calculated a priori, which determines the underlying Markov chain of
the 5-minute MDP. At each t0 = {0, l, . . . , t0, . . . , T − 2l, T − l}, J is then calculated
for xt02 values such that x
t0
2 ∈ X t02 .
The LP is solved given the fixed energy consumption qP , and reserve offer qR






t0 |qP , qR) (3.21)
subject to
h(st) + J ≤ g(st, u) +
∑
st+1
P x(xt+12 |xt2, ut)P (yt+1, dt+1|yt, dt)h(st+1),
∀st ∈ St,∀t < t0 + l,∀u ∈ Ust (3.22)
h(st0+l) + J ≤ g(st0+l) +
∑
yt0 ,dt0
P lh(st0), ∀st ∈ St, t = t0 + l,∀u ∈ Ust (3.23)
where g(st0+l) = Ĵ(xt0+l2 ). Ust is the set of allowable controls given state s
t, and St
is the set of reachable states at t that is calculated a priori before the optimization
and includes X t2, h(s
t) is the differential cost of state st, and g(st, u) is the cost per
period function given in (3.13). State st+1 is the new state that can be reached from
st. Given state st, state st+1 is defined as the following:
st+1 = {xt+12 , yt + ∆yt, dt+1, t+ 1}
Battery state xt2 evolves probabilistically as described by equations (3.15) and (3.17).
∆yt is based on the stochastic dynamics of the regulation signal as defined in Section
3.4.2.
The dual variables of the inequality constraints (3.22) represent the steady state
probabilities that the system is at state st using the optimal control. Note that, for
the same x2, y, d levels, different values of t correspond to different levels of differential
cost h(st) = h(x2, y, d, t), meaning that the LP solutions capture the dependency of
differential cost on the auxiliary time state t.








P x(xt+12 |xt2, ut) is the probability of x2 transition with possible values ε and 1− ε
as given by (3.17). P l represents the equal probability transition to the vector of d




LP solutions reveal that average cost J(xt02 , y
t0|qP , qR) of each 5 minute MDP
exhibits an exponential trend with respect to yt0 , for fixed xt02 . This reduces the
computational burden by eliminating the need to evaluate the LP-based MDP for all
yt0 ∈ y. At each t0 starting from T − l, for a fixed xt02 , LP is solved for a few yt0
values. Then, for a fixed xt02 , the following exponential function is used to estimate
J(yt0|qP , qR, xt02 ) for all yt0 ∈ y:
J(yt0|qP , qR, xt02 ) = α1eβ1y
t0 + C1 (3.24)
The exponential function parameters α1, β1 and C1 are estimated using a least squares
fit for each t0 and x
t0
2 ∈ X t02 . Average cost with respect to the battery state xt02 is
obtained by averaging J(yt0|qP , qR, xt02 ) over yt0 values:





J(yt0|qP , qR, xt02 ). (3.25)
where |y| is the cardinality of y. The equality in (3.25) is based on the assumption
that all y ∈ y values are equally likely at t0.
LP solutions reveal that, average cost J(xt02 |qP , qR) obtained by (3.25) is also
exponential with respect to xt02 , for fixed t0. Thus, J(x
t0
2 |qP , qR) is evaluated for
certain xt02 ∈ X t02 and an exponential function similar to (3.24) is used:
J(xt02 |qP , qR) = α2eβ2x
t0
2 + C2, ∀xt02 ∈ X t02 (3.26)
Finally, cost-to-go from t0 to the end of the hour T is calculated as a function
of the average cost J(xt02 |qP , qR), as described in equation (3.20). The cost-to-go
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approximation, Ĵ(xt02 |qP , qR), is then used as the terminal transition cost in the sub-
sequent MDP that is associated with time t0 − l to t0. We note that both of the
exponential functions given in (3.24) and (3.26) are single variate functions, hence,
the functional parameters are less challenging to optimize compared to a multivariate
exponential function that is a function of both x2 and y. This is a simplification that
ignores the correlation between the x2 and y states and allows us to bypass the need
to optimize functional parameters of a multivariate exponential function for every t0.
We elaborate on this approximation further in Subsection 4.2.2 as a part of the future
work.
Algorithm 6 :Successive LP-based MDP Algorithm
For a given x02, q
P , and qR, calculate the set X t02 , ∀t0 ∈ {0, l, . . . , t0, . . . , T−2l, T−l}
where X02 = x
0
2. Initialize t0 = T − l and gT (xT2 ) = 0;
while t0 6= 0 do
Step 1. Calculate the set St, ∀t ∈ {t0, t0 + 1, . . . , t0 + l}.
Step 2. For some xt02 ∈ X t02 and yt0 ∈ y, solve the LP in (3.21) subject to
(3.22) and (3.23), with initial state xt02 and y
t0 , and terminal cost gt0+l(x2
t0+l) =
Ĵ(xt0+l2 ), where x2
t0+l ∈ St0+l. Obtain J(xt02 , yt02 ) for the set of xt02 , yt02 values that
are used as initial states for the LP.
Step 3. Calculate J(xt02 ), ∀xt02 ∈ X t02 as described by equations (3.24), (3.25),
and (3.26).
Step 3. Set gt0(xt02 ) = J(x
t0
2 )l.
Update t0 := t0 − l
end while
return J(x02|qP , qR)
The algorithm to obtain average hourly tracking cost, J(x02|qP , qR), through suc-
cessive LP-based MDP solutions is described in detail in Algorithm 6.
We proceed in the next section with numerical results, and solve the LP numer-
ically for various values of qP , qR, and x02, obtaining the average cost of each MDP
and doing so synthesizing the average hourly cost J(x02|qP , qR).
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3.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we present numerical results obtained by successive evaluation of
the LP-based MDP solutions, for various levels of hourly fixed energy consumption
and reserve offer qP and qR, as well as initial x2 at the beginning of the hour, x
0
2.
Numerical results reveal interesting trends in average tracking cost J̄(x02|qP , qR) with
respect to qP , qR, and x02.
3.5.1 Optimal Deployment and Average Cost Results
In the following experiments, battery capacity is assumed to be 24 kwh, with x2 =
x1 = 12 kwh. Time is discretized with ∆t=20 second intervals, and the lookahead
length l is equal to 5 minutes. Regulation signal y and x2 are discretized with ∆y =
1/7, ∆x2 = 0.02 kwh, respectively. Thus, |y| = 15 and |x2| = 600. ∆y is selected
assuming a regulation response time of 2.3 minutes. 20 second multi-step transition
probabilities of the regulation signal y is calculated using the single-step transition
matrix P (y) raised to the power of ∆t
2 sec




, 1]. Hence, |u| = |y| when qP = qR, and |u| > |y| when qP > qR. Finally,
the KiBaM parameter κ is equal to 2.1, which is selected based on battery charging
simulations and captures the significantly reduced allowable charging rate after the
SoC reaches around 90%. In all numerical experiments, it is assumed that the outlet
power capacity is high enough to support a charging rate as high as qP + qR, which
is the maximum possible real-time charging rate with u = 1.
Levels of energy consumption and reserve offer, qP and qR, that are evaluated
with the proposed average cost MDP methodology are shown in Figure 3·7. All qP
and qR levels shown in Figure 3·7 are evaluated for the x02 values that are within the
range [0, x02(q
P )], where x02(q
P ) is the maximum initial x2 level at the beginning of the
hour that can support the constant given charging rate qP during the hour without
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Figure 3·7: Levels of qP and qR that are evaluated with the proposed
average cost MDP methodology
exceeding the capacity of x2; x2. As such, the tracking error function as part of the
EV day ahead hourly energy consumption and reserve offer scheduling problem shown
in 3.12 is never evaluated outside its boundaries, due to constraint (3.10).
We remind the reader that the average imbalance between the two buckets, β, is
calculated based on constant average charging rate qP , hence it is identical across the
numerical experiments that have the same qP level.
We first provide results on the behaviour of the optimal control ut with respect to
xt2, y
t, and time t. Figure 3·8 shows the quadratic tracking error, obtained by solving
the LP for fixed qP = 9 kw, and for two qR levels equal to 9 kw and 3.5 kw. Results
are shown for extreme y values equal to -1 and 1, and plotted with respect to the
level of the second bucket xt2 and time within the hour t. Figure 3·8 also shows the
interpolant fit to discrete tracking error results. Expectedly, quadratic tracking error
has an increasing trend with respect to battery level x2 and signal y, for fixed t. For
instance, for qR = 9 kw and y = −1, tracking error is equal to zero ∀t and ∀x2.
On the contrary, tracking error decreases with time, meaning the optimal control is
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Figure 3·8: Quadratic tracking error for fixed signal values of −1 and
1, and signal direction d = 1, with respect to x2 level and time t within
the hour. Results are shown for two levels of hourly fixed reserve bid
qR (kw). Interpolants fit to discrete results also shown.
closer to the signal y, for a given x2 level as the hour reaches to end, since reaching the
capacity of x2, x2, earlier during the hour causes higher accumulation of the tracking
error. This is because the battery charging dynamics enforces a significantly reduced
maximum allowable charging rate, u, when x2 = x2. Thus, tracking error is higher
for xt2 levels that are likely to bring the battery level to the proximity of x2 earlier
in the hour (i.e., |yt − ut| > |yt+∆t − ut+∆t|), in order to avoid future high tracking
costs. We observe similar qualitative characteristic in the optimal control behaviour
in other numerical qP and qR instances.
Figure 3·8 shows that for certain x2 levels, quadratic tracking error is higher when
the reserve offer qR is lower, when y is negative. The reason is that if qR < qP , then

























Figure 3·9: Quadratic tracking cost g(u, y|qR) with respect to x2 and
y, given d = 1, at the last remaining 5 minutes of the hour; t = T − 5
mins. Results are shown for a fixed qR and three different levels of qP .
Size of the bubbles represents the tracking error.
tracking negative signals requires charging with a higher rate when qR = 3.5 kw as
opposed to qR = 9 kw, for a fixed qP = 9 kw. This is challenging especially for higher
levels of x2 since the relief from following negative y signals, hence charging with
rates close to 0 kw, is nonexistent when qR < qP . However, (i) the probability of
reaching very high levels of x2 is lower for fixed q
P when the reserve offer qR is lower,
which is captured in the average tracking cost J , (ii) tracking cost per period function
g(st, ut|qR) is quadratic in qR, therefore tracking cost increases with the reserve offer
qR.
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Figure 3·10: Average cost J(xt02 , yt0|qP , qR) with respect to y levels,
and three different x2 levels, for a fixed q
P and qR. Results are shown
for fixed t0 = T −5 min. Exponential fit for each x2 level is also shown.
Figure 3·9 compares quadratic tracking cost per period, g(st, ut|qR), at t = T − 5
minutes, among three different qP levels for a fixed reserve offer qR, with respect to x2
and the signal y, and for a fixed signal direction d = 1. Overall, tracking cost increases
both in x2 level and signal y. Expectedly, we also observe that with increasing average
energy consumption qP , tracking cost also increases. Note that for a higher qP when
qR is fixed, both qP −qR and qP +qR are higher, meaning that following both negative
and positive signal values requires charging with a higher rate. In other words, as qP
increases, signal tracking is more cautious.
We proceed to the average cost results obtained by solving a single 5-minute MDP.
Exponential trend of average tracking cost J(xt02 , y
t0 |qP , qR) is illustrated for a given
qP and qR level in Figure 3·10. We observe the same exponential trend for other qP
and qR levels. Results reveal that J(xt02 |qP , qR) is also exponential with respect to
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Figure 3·11: Average cost J(xt02 ) with respect to xt02 for a fixed qP ,
and three different levels of qR. Exponential fit to each qP and qR level
is also shown.
xt02 , for a fixed t0, as shown in Figure 3·11.
Through successive LP-based solution of 5-minute MDPs, we are able to synthesize
average hourly tracking cost, J(x02|qP , qR), at the last step of the proposed MDP
methodology. Figure 3·12 shows the average hourly tracking cost J(x02|qP , qR), with
respect to the initial battery level x02 at the beginning of the hour and the reserve
offer qR, for a fixed average energy consumption qP . The average hourly tracking
cost, which is obtained at the last step of the successive LP-based MDP solutions
(Algorithm 6), has a sigmoid trend with respect to the reserve quantity qR. As
discussed previously, this is due to the fact that for a fixed qP level and negative y
values, qP + yqR increases with decreasing qR. This has an opposing effect on the
ability to track the signal for positive and negative y values. On one hand, a smaller
qR value reduces the required charging rate for y > 0, however, increases it for y < 0.
Nevertheless, since the average tracking cost is exponential with respect to the
energy bid qP , we also approximate J as an exponential function with respect to qR
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Function fit R2 SSE
Exponential (3.27) 0.970 370.6
Sigmoid (3.28) 0.972 344.8
Table 3.1: Comparison of the exponential (3.27) versus sigmoid (3.28)
fit for the average tracking cost function
in the expense of a less optimal functional fit in terms of sum of square of errors, in
order to preserve convexity of the EV day ahead hourly scheduling problem in (3.12).
In conclusion, J(x02|qP , qR) is approximated as a multi-variate exponential function
with respect to x02, q
P , and qR as the following:
J(x02|qP , qR) = max{0, αeβ
1x02+β
2qP +β3qR + C} (3.27)
A truncated function is used since the lower bound of the average tracking cost
J(x02|qP , qR) is equal to zero. The fit of the multi-variate exponential function given
above in (3.27) to the discrete results obtained by numerically evaluating all the qP
and qR levels shown in Figure 3·7 yields an R2 value of 0.97. The optimal functional
parameters α, β1, β2, β3, and C are equal to 3.76e − 04, 0.013, 0.512, 0.194, and
−0.446, respectively.
We compare the exponential fit to a sigmoidal function fit, which is given as the
following:





Table 3.1 compares the exponential versus sigmoid fit for the average tracking cost
function with respect to R2 and Sum of Squared Errors (SSE) values. Even though
the sigmoid fit performs slightly better, results are highly similar.
We adopt the exponential function given in (3.27), in order to preserve the con-
vexity of the EV scheduling problems and avoid adding computational complexity.
The multi-variate exponential function αeβ
1x02+β
2qP +β3qR + C is convex and its
Hessian is given by the following for a given hour h:
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Figure 3·12: Average cost for a given energy bid qP , with respect to











The eigenvalues of the above Hessian is given by {0, 0, β21 + β22 + β23}, therefore,
average tracking cost function given in (3.27) is convex.
The average tracking cost can then be used in the objective function of the optimal
day ahead energy and reserve scheduling problem in the form of γJ(xh2 |qP,h, qR,h),
where xh2 is the battery level at the beginning of hour h, and γ is a calibrating
parameter that can be used to translate the average tracking error to cost per hour.
3.5.2 Computational Characteristics and Parallelization
The computation of the average tracking cost with respect to each energy (qP ), reserve
(qR), and initial battery state (x02) value is entirely parallelizable. For given q
P ,qR,
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and x02 values, the exponential trend of the five-minute average cost obtained by
the solution of a single MDP, J(xt02 , y
t0|qP , qR), with respect to xt02 and yt0 allows
us to reduce the computational burden of our proposed methodology by calculating
J(xt02 , y
t0|qP , qR) only for some xt02 and yt0 , and using an exponential function as shown
in (3.27). We do so by selecting in total ten xt02 values and three y
t0 values, hence, at
each t0, we calculate the average cost J(x
t0
2 , y
t0|qP , qR) with respect to thirty xt02 and
yt0 points. Note that for certain xt02 values, it is guaranteed that J(x
t0
2 , y
t0|qP , qR) = 0,
if the probability P (xT2 = x2|x
t0
2 ) is equal to zero. This can be calculated a priori
without having the solve the LP. For the remaining xt02 and y
t0 values, each LP can
be solved in parallel. Table 3.2 shows the number of constraints and variables in the
LP, as well as the run time for a certain xt02 , y
t0 , and t0 values. LP run time for a fixed
xt02 increases as t0 decreases, (as the terminal costs increase). LPs are implemented
and solved using AIMMS 4.0.




t0 Constraints Variables Run time (sec)
55 11, 0.14 268,741 18,290 70.83
55 11.6, 0.14 150,867 10,750 45.83
35 11, 0.14 268,741 18,290 73.52
35 10.4, 0.14 308,071 20,540 88.37
35 11.6, 0.14 150,867 10,750 235.87
15 11, 0.14 268,741 18,290 101.25
15 11.6, 0.14 150,867 10,750 364.67
3.6 Analysis of Optimality Conditions of Day Ahead EV
Scheduling Problem with the Inclusion of Tracking Cost
In this section, we analyze the optimality conditions of the day ahead EV scheduling
problem shown in (3.12), including the tracking cost.
The day ahead EV scheduling problem solved by EV j in the presence of the
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tracking cost and the hourly KiBaM dynamics is written as follows. For simplicity,










































2 ≥ s→ ζ (3.32)
qPh ≤ qP → νh1 , ∀h (3.33)
qPh + q
R
h ≤ P out → νh2 ,∀h (3.34)
qRh − qPh ≤ 0→ νh3 ,∀h (3.35)
































h + νh2 + ν
h
3 = 0 (3.37)
In the absence of the tracking cost, we have shown in Lemma 2.7.1 in Part I of
this thesis that at least one of the constraints (3.34) and (3.35) is binding, which
allowed us to conclude that at the optimal solution, reserve offer is either equal to the
energy consumption or charging capacity minus consumption. However, first order
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optimality conditions above reveal that the same result cannot be applied under the
inclusion of the tracking cost. More specifically, from (3.37), it is possible that both
νh2 and ν
h
3 are equal to zero, hence constraints (3.34) and (3.35) can be both non-
binding. That is, reserve offer can be strictly less than energy consumption while
their total is also strictly less than P out.
3.7 Part II Conclusion and Summary
In this part of the thesis, we have presented a novel backward-recursion and multi-
step average cost MDP based methodology to estimate the EV costs associated with
deploying regulation reserves. This cost component is crucial to incorporate in the
hourly day ahead energy consumption and reserve offer decisions, since regulation
reserve market is performance based. Successive LP-based MDP solutions synthe-
size the finite lookahead DP problems and average hourly tracking cost. Through
modeling infinite replications of a finite horizon Markov Chain, we capture the de-
pendency of the optimal control on time within the hour. Our proposed methodology
is tractable and can be applied to other domains of multi-stage stochastic decision
making problems. Some modeling aspects that are open to improvement includes the
stochastic dynamics of the regulation signal, which can be more advanced. For in-
stance, the dynamics potentially could include the age of the signal, i.e., the number of
periods that the signal have been increasing/decreasing, at the expense of increasing
the dimension of the state space.
Future work includes calibration of the average hourly tracking cost to be used
as a cost component in the optimal EV day ahead energy and reserve scheduling
problems, and expanding the analytical study that is included in Subsection 3.6 of the
scheduling problem with the inclusion of the tracking cost in the objective function.
The numerical impact of the tracking cost component on the energy and reserve
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consumption/offer decisions can also be investigated.
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Chapter 4
Thesis Conclusion and Future Work
4.1 Summary and Conclusion
In this thesis, we have introduced and formulated in detail various decentralized day
ahead distribution market clearing designs in the presence of EVs. Extension of
transmission wholesale markets to distribution networks and their newly emerging
participants has become the focus due to the need for efficient and reliable operation
of distribution grids. Unfortunately, traditional transmission markets cannot be di-
rectly extended to distribution networks, due to the vast difference in dimensionality
of transmission and distribution grids. We therefore turn our attention to decen-
tralized market designs where EVs or Load Aggregators self-schedule consumption
and regulation reserve offer according to dynamic spatiotemporal price signals. Our
market clearing designs encompass multi-product, multi-period markets where gen-
erators and EVs participate in energy and reserve markets. We formulate various
decentralized market designs that differ in EVs’ access to distribution network feeder
information and whether they participate in the market individually or through a
Load Aggregator. Although the centralized design is intractable for large problems,
we solve it for small instances and use it as a benchmark to our decentralized mar-
ket clearing equilibria. We model the salient characteristics of the T&D network
including distribution network losses. Analytical results indicate that the centralized
and decentralized equilibria do not match, which is a result supported by numerical
experiments. In other terms, decentralized market equilibria are not efficient. The
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numerical results show that EVs achieve lower costs when they self-schedule in all
of the decentralized designs, compared to the social welfare maximizing centralized
design with a single operator who clears the market in a single step. The centralized
market design with multiple collaborating operators is identical both numerically and
analytically to information unaware self-scheduling market design. EVs achieve the
lowest cost in the expense of the social welfare when scheduled by an information
aware load aggregator. In our numerical results, we investigate the severity of the
market power exhibited by EVs.
We also address the equilibrium existence and uniqueness issues that arise with
decentralized market designs through applying game theoretical methods. Using a
potential function approach, and showing diagonal strict convexity of individual EV
or LA cost functions as an alternative proof, we prove uniqueness of the equilibrium
in the non-cooperative games that arise in decentralized designs. We then construct
closed form equilibrium expressions of the EV schedules for a simplified two-period
market model.
In the second part, we employ a novel Markovian Decision Process (MDP) ap-
proach to the optimal regulation reserve deployment problem modeling a realistic
battery charging behavior in the seconds time scale. EVs who promise a certain level
of regulation reserves respond to the energy neutral regulation signal that is reset
every two seconds by the system operator, and might have difficulty following the
signal perfectly and incur tracking error if a high level of reserves is promised. Our
goal is therefore to estimate the average hourly regulation signal tracking cost of EVs,
by employing several discretization techniques to tackle with the curse of dimension-
ality, and repeatedly solving, through Linear Programming, multi-step average cost
Markovian Decision Processes (MDPs). Inspired by the numerical solutions of the
MDP methodology for certain instances, we then form convex cost relationships that
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map hourly average charging rate and regulation reserves offered to the hourly regula-
tion reserve tracking cost. These cost functions can then be used to influence the EV
energy consumption and regulation reserve offer decisions in the day ahead market.
4.2 Future Work
4.2.1 Part I-Market Designs
We list the possible future extensions for the Part I of this thesis as follows:
• The relation between energy and reserve prices (LMPs) One of the as-
sumptions we made when showing the existence and uniqueness of decentralized
equilibria in Section 2.7 was that energy prices are higher than reserve prices ev-
ery hour, that is, λP > λR, ∀h (Assumption 1). This assumption is required for
the convexity of the transformed EV scheduling problems under High Charging
Flexibility, given in (2.67), (2.68), (2.69), and (2.70), since the total EV cost is
a function of λP − λR. However, this assumption is not required for Moderate
and Low Charging Flexibility input partitions, since the EV cost is a function
of λP + λR.
Energy prices are indeed generally higher than reserve prices in practice, how-
ever, hours where the opposite holds are not uncommon due to high penetration
of renewable generation. Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate the market
designs by relaxing this assumption. Firstly, we can show that Lemmas 2.7.1.(i)-
(iv) hold regardless of the sign of λP − λR. Secondly, relaxing the assumption
of λP > λR does not affect the Moderate and Low Charging Flexibility input
space partitions, hence, we comment on how the relaxation of this assumption
impacts the analysis of EV games under High Charging Flexibility.
If λPh < λ
R
h , ∀h, then the transformed EV scheduling problems are identical
to (2.67), (2.68), (2.69), and (2.70), since Assumption 2 automatically holds.
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However, these problems are no longer convex, and the best response of an
EV is an increasing function in other EVs’ total consumption. That is, an
EV’s net revenue, (1 + mh)(λ
R
h − λPh ) increases as mt increases. These type
of games, in fact, are defined as submodular games and are not guaranteed to
possess a unique Nash equilibrium. In that case, the closed form solutions for
the multiple Nash Equilibrium could be explored, for the simplified two-hour
problems introduced in Section 2.8.
• AC power flow In this thesis, we have employed a simplified distribution net-
work model where the total demand is aggregated at the end of a single line
that connects the distribution location to the substation. We also adopted a
simple DC power flow model where voltage levels of the distribution network
nodes are not modeled/considered. Therefore, a possible future direction is the
investigation of (i) To what extent do the differences in hourly total EV con-
sumption observed across the market designs impact voltage level differences?,
or (ii) How does a more accurate distribution network power flow model in-
cluding voltage limit constraints affect equilibria differences among the market
designs proposed in this thesis?
A starting point could be the widely adopted power flow equations for radial
distribution networks introduced in (Baran and Wu, 1989), which require ad-
ditional reactive power flow/injection, current, and voltage variables, as well as
voltage limit constraints. However, incorporation of reactive power as a third
market commodity can provide a more complicated multi-commodity case.
4.2.2 Part II-Optimal Reserve Deployment
• Correlation of terminal x2 and y states The cost-to-go calculations at each
t0 is approximated by assuming that at t0 + l, the terminal reachable states
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transition back to the initial states with equal probability, which allows us to
write







When solving the MDP at the previous 5-min period, J(xt02 |qP , qR)l is used
as an approximation for the cost-to-go from terminal x2 states, regardless of
the terminal y state. This, however, is an oversimplification and disregards
the correlation between x2 and y states. An alternative is to fit a multivariate
J(xt02 , y
t0 |qP , qR) function which is exponential both in xt02 and yt0 . Our simula-
tions included in Section 3.5.1 obtain 30 data points (10 for xt02 , 3 for y
t0), and
these data points can be used to fit J(xt02 , y
t0|qP , qR) directly to a multi-variate
exponential function, which can then be used as the cost-to-approximation from
each x2 and y terminal reachable state, thereby capturing the correlation be-
tween these two states.
• Optimal policy functional approximation efforts It is important to note
that average hourly tracking cost can be alternatively obtained through func-
tional policy approximation and finite horizon (1-hour) Monte Carlo simulations
using the policy function. In fact, previous efforts have been made to perform a
functional approximation to the optimal reserve deployment decisions, similar
to work in (Bilgin et al., 2015). The policy function was obtained from the dis-
crete optimal reserve and state pairs only in the last 5-minute lookahead period,
as a function of a projection of all states to an indicative state, P x2 , defined as
the following:
P x2 = P (xt+52 = x2|xt2, yt, dt) (4.1)
The above was calculated through 100 5-minute simulated trajectories of the
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yt, if yt < ut
ut, if otherwise
(4.2)
which represents perfect tracking if feasible.
Functional policy is then given by:
ut = ûtmyopic(1− P x2)α (4.3)
The above policy function implies that the level of optimal deployment com-
pared to myopic control decreases (i.e., tracking is more cautious) as probability
of x2 reaching the capacity during the next 5 minutes, P
x2 , increases. The single
functional parameter, α, then need to be optimized/fine tuned through pertur-
bation analysis in the finite horizon simulations, using the discrete optimal
policy-state pairs obtained from the solution of LP as the starting point.
We have instead employed the average cost MDP methodology that captures
the dependency of optimal policy on time, in order to obtain the hourly tracking
cost, due to the following issues with the functional policy approximation given
in (4.3):
– The policy function is obtained from the discrete optimal policy-state pairs
only in the last 5 minute-lookahead, hence, is myopic.
– Optimization of the functional parameter for each fixed qP , qR, and x02
level is computationally burdensome,
– There are many other options for aggregating the state space to an indica-
tive state, and evaluation of alternative functions might not be straight-
forward.
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Nevertheless, a more sophisticated functional approximation can be constructed
with the following considerations:
– Energy and reserve quantities, qP , qR, can be directly incorporated in the
policy function,
– Policy function can depend on ”time remaining in the hour”, in the ex-
pense of complicating the policy function and potentially requiring multiple
functional parameters.
• Impact of tracking cost on analytical results In the lack of hourly track-
ing cost J(x02|qP , qR) in the day ahead EV scheduling problems, the first order
optimality conditions revealed that EVs are incentivized to offer as much re-
serves as possible, at one of the two possible levels shown in Corollary 2.7.1.1.
This is because reserve provision is not associated with any cost in the EV’s
total cost. One natural question, then, is how the exponential expression for
hourly reserve provision given in (3.27), which is established in Part II of this
thesis, will affect the qualitative as well as quantitative results obtained with
regards to the optimal schedules of EVs. In order to preserve the convexity of
transformed EV scheduling problems, we have employed a convex function for
the tracking cost.
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